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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
AND THE POLISH-SAXON QUESTION 
-2-
The Congress of Vienna met according to the arrange-
ments made at the first Peace of Paris. When the Congress met, 
the first serious problems which it had to face were Poland and 
Saxony. The reasons for the grave importance of these were 
rather simply that they represented primary interests of two 
of the Great Powers (Russia and Prussia), and they threatened 
the security of France and Austria and evon England indirectly. 
The Russian claim on Poland dated back a number of years 
to when the Emperor of Russia, Alexander I, was in his youth 
and being educated by the liberals La Harpe and Czartoryski. 
There is little doubt that Alexander took seriously the pro­
testations of these two men about the grave evil of th� par-
titions of Poland and the grandness that would be associated 
with the reconstruction of the ancient Kingdom. As .Napoleon 
was being defeated and Alexander was fast becoming the savior 
of Europe, he did not forget the lessons of his old masters, 
and when he passed through Poland he promised the Poles that 
1 
he would see that an independent Kingdom of Poland was erected. 
1 
The background to AJ.exa.nder I is taken chiefly from 
Madam La Comtesse de Choiseul-Gouffier, Historical Memoirs of 
Alexander I and the C.ourt of Russia. (Chicago: A. c.. McClurg 
and Co., 190'0};" C.Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I 
Vol. III (London: Tinsley Brothers, IS'75); and-:Adam OzartorYski 
Memoirs of Prince CzartoHski and his Correspondence with llexa.nderI, ed. Aaam Gi gud, VO!.il (London: Reiill:gton and Co., 
1888). 
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Alexander's Kingdom of Poland was not to be all of 
Poland but a portion of it known as the Duchy of Warsaw which 
had been earlier established by Napoleon and given to the King 
of Saxony. The desires of Alexander to create a kingdom of 
Poland were, of course, known to the other �'uropean powers 
and most of them had some reason to fear his desires. A 
Russian Poland would leave the old frontiers of both Prussia 
ru1d Austria in Russian hands.2 France and England both feared 
this situation because they did not wish to see Russia made 
too powerful for her neighbors.3 
The Saxon port�on of the question was the result of 
the Russian demands. If Russia was to be aggrandized in 
Poland, this would take some of the territories belonging to 
Frussia and Austria. Austrian demands couid be adequately 
it not satisfactorily quenched in Italy.4 Prusnia had only 
2castlereagh to the Emperor of Russia. Vienna, October 
12, 1814, Arthur Duke of Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches, 
Correspondence and Memoranda of li'ield Marshal Arthur Duke of 
Welliffton (London: John Murray, i862) Vol. IX, pp. 330-331:" Herea ter referred to as Wellington S.D. 
3Ta1leyrand to Louis XVI!I. Vi�nna, September 25, 1814. 
The Correspondence of Prince Talle�rand and Louis XVIII Duri� the Co�ress of Vieiliia (New York: harles Scribner's Sons, 1 1) 
PP:- 1- • Hereafter referred to as Talleyrand Correspondence ; 
and Liverpool to Castlereagh, Fife House, September 25, 1814. 
Wellington, £.Q., Vol. IX, PP• 285-286. 
4castlereagh to Liver:0ool, Vienna, October 4, 1814. c. K. 
Webster, "Englcnd and The Polish-Saxon Problem at The CongresD 
of Vienna," Transactions .2f. The Royal Historical Societ� t Third Saries, Vol. VII (London: Royal Historical Society, 191 ;, 
Appendix P. 73. Hereafter referred to as Webster, "The PolL:.:h­
Suxon Question. 
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Saxony to which she could look for sufficient aggrandizement 
for her projected losses in Poland. The King of Saxony had 
in the eyes of many of the European powers, including Prussia, 
Russ ia, England, and to certain extent Austria, lost his rights 
because of his loyalty to Napoleon.5 
The representatives of France and England are the two 
representatives whose policies are the best to examine in 
relation to the Polish-Saxon question. England and France by 
their own admission were the two powers least involved, directly, 
in the territprial disputes, and they were both in positions to 
act as mediators.6 
Englund, represented by Lord Castlereagh, held the 
advantageous position of semi-isolation. Castlereagh was aware 
that the insular position of England allowed her to observe 
continental affairs and to step in at the proper time on the 
most expedient side to fore< a conclusion.7 Castlereagh ' s 
interpretatioi1 of continental affairs was that which he had 
5castlereagh to Wellincton, Vienna, October 20, 1814, 
Wellington, S.D. Vol. IX, pp. 357-359. 
6 
--
'i/ellington to Castlereagh, Iilons, Augu�t 18, 1814. 
Viocoun.t Castlerea.ght Correspondence Dispatches, nnd Other 
Papers of Viscount Cast!ereagh, e<I. c. W. Vane, VOI:" X, pp. 93-94. 
Hereafter referred to as Castlereagh Correspondence; Wellington 
t0 Castlereagh, Paris, October 9, 1814. Castlereagh Corre$pond­
ence Vol. X, pp. 160-161; and Castlereagh to the Emperor of' Russia , 
Vienna, October 12, 1814. Wellington, �·�· Vol. IX, p. 329. 
7castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, December 5t 1814. 
Wellington , S.D. Vol. IX, PP• 462-465. - -
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inherited from Pitt and others.8 The prime objective o:f England 
was to establish a bala..�oe of power which would enable the 
continent to live in peace and England to pursue her most in­
tent interests which were cO!lli"Uercial. The position of Castle-
reagh at the Congress was to some extent hampered by the lack 
of understanding and interest in continental a.ff airs which 
existed in England. Castlereagh realized that he would have 
to def end his dealings at Vienna to a not too sympathetic 
Parliament when he returned.9 The problem of defense to the 
Parliament wa$ accentuated by the weak position of the Liver-
pool Cabinet which at its outset was expected to be very short 
lived. 10 
English policy at the Congress is not difficult to 
recognize, but the value of the British position is not that 
it sought a power balance alone but that 1t allowed Castle-
reagh the flexibility to chal'lga his position as the necessity 
arose. In exLmining the diplomacy of Castlereagh at the 
Congress of Vienna, one muf\t keep in mind that his great in-
terest wa� to establish a balance, and the importance of his 
�dward V. Gulich, Eu.roRe's Classical Balance of 
Po'tver (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp.205-206. 
9Li verpool to Castlereagh, Ii'ife House, September 25, 
1814, Wellington, S.D. Vol. IX, PP• 825-826; Liverpool to 
Castlereagh, F·ife House, October 14, 1814, Wellington, S.D. 
Vol. IX, pp. 342-344. 
- -
1011enry A. Kissi�er, A World Restored (New York: 
Grosset and Dunlop, 1964), p.-29. 
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dealings vms the way in which he accompllsheu this end. 
li'rance, rGp:.esented by Prince Talleyrand, was, like 
Engla.�d, not directly involved in the territorial disputes 
related to the Polish-Saxon question.11 France, however, 
entered the Congress only through the generosity of the otber 
Powers at the Treaty of Paris. 12 Her position vn:i.s no-t in the 
beginning one of strenfrth. Talleyrand could riot come to the 
Congress, as did Pru.ssia or Ru0si::i., demandi:ng aggrandizement 
because she was a defeated power and her territorial questions 
had all been �ettled by the Treaty of Paris.13 She also could 
not expect to be accepted as readily as England since she was 
not an ally of the other Great Powers. 
Talleyrand, as representative of France, could not have 
entered the discussions at the· Congress with a general and 
open policy as did Castlereagh, and so he 1tdsely chose to 
br..�=>e his stru1d on principle. Perhaps, the greatest fear 
generated by :.?ranee was the fear springing from he1" revolution-
'a:r'J spirit so recently eXL"llbi ted in the Frerich H.evolution. 
Talleyrand did much to keep this fear in check by supporting 
o. conservative principle. His principle , which he called 
0lccitimacy," was based upon the idea that sovereigns gain 
11Tulleyrand to Louis .Alf III, Vienna, November 17, 
1814. Prince Talleyrand, Memoirs of the Prince De Talleyrand, 
ed. The Due De Broglie, Vol. II, pp. 320-330. Hereafter re­
ferred to an Talleyrand, Memoirs. 
12see Appendix II. 
13see Appendix II. 
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their power from their inheritance and from just cessions 
made to them and not by conquest.14By following such a con-
servative policy, Talleyrand was actually following the mont 
expedient line for France. When Guglielmo Fe1 rero in "The 
Reconstruction .2f Europe 11 claims that 'ra.J.leyrand came to 
tl;.e Congress in opposi ticn to the principles of e ·xpediency, l5 
he is only partly correct since Talleyrand was following what 
was expedient for France. 
The Congress of Vienna offered Talleyrand the oppor-
tuni ty to have l"rance accepted as a major force in Europeru1 
diplom�cy, and this was his primary objective throughout. 
Upon his c.rrival, he found the Four Powers (Prussia, Russia, 
Austricc., and Er...gland ) , who had formed an alliance to defeat 
Na.poleo�, ntill allied to settle the affairs of Europe. Hio 
first ob jective was to deotroy if possible the old coalition 
V> •. 1ich had defeated Napoleon and bring France into European 
16 affairs as an equal. Secondly, he intended to oppose the 
dcmancs of both Pru.Bsia and Rusoia. He v1as e..;pecially con-
14Talleyrand to Louis A"VIII, Vienna, December 7, 1814, 
Talleyrand, �.lemoirs Vol. I I ,  p. 355. 
l5GuglieL"ilo Fcr:re ro, The Reconstruction of Europe -
Tr>.lleyr and and The Cons1ess ofVienna tr. T. ti. Jueckel, (Nevi 
York: w. W. Norton and Compruzy, 1963). 
16Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Viem1a, October 4, 1814, 
Talleyrand, Correa�ondence pp. 12-24. 'l:alleyra.nd doeo not say 
specifically that is prime object is to destroy the alliance, 
but the veno� with which he trects the alliance i� sufficient 
:;.nclication o= hie s0ntiments. 
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cerned about Pn1ssia since he considered a too powerful 
Prussia as a threat to the future of France and Europe alike.17 
Russian desires for Poland were to be opposed because they 
strengthened Prussian demands on Saxony and also because Talley-
rand saw Rusaia as a threat if she were to become a tru.ly 
.J.i..'uropean power. 
As the opening of the Congress drew near, Talleyrand 
and Castlereagh came to Vienna as potential mediators. The 
advantage was clearly in the hands of Castlereagh. Talleyrand 
had to first �ivide the allies or hope for circUI!lstances to 
divide them and then become accepted by the powers as right-
fully to be consulted in the a.ff airs of Europe .  
The Polish-Saxon question was the first serious 
business to come before the CQngress. At the beginning of 
the Cori-1.r,ress t there was ari. apparent domination of the Polish­
Saxon discussions by Castlereagh.18This apparent domination 
can, however, be misleading. Castlereagh, it will be seen led 
the opposition to the Tsar's Polish schemes alld also led Austria 
in support of Prussia's claims on Saxony. It is impor·tant to 
watch the activities of 'ralleyra.nd which were directed at under­
mining·. the efforts of Castlereagh to gain an agreement among 
the Four Powers on the Polish-Saxon question. 
l7Ta1leyrand to Louis XVIII , October 31, 1814, Talleyrand, Memoirs Vol. I I  pp. 289-294. 
18This is the interpretation of c. K. Webster. Webster, 
0The Polish-Saxon Question," App·endix pp. 58-59. 
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As will be seen, Oastlereag� failed in his plan to 
create a powerful Prussia by giving her Saxony and to prevent 
the excessive development of Russia by thwarting her Polish 
scheme�. This could blandly be attributed to the efforts of 
Talleyrand", but this iB also not quite the case . Talleyrand 
did hope to see the dinsolution of thn alliance, which he saw 
ac an alliance against Fra..'Yl.ce, but he did no t so much effect 
the dissolution as he took advantage of the breakdown and did 
all in his power to encourage it. 
During the early period, there are three important 
developments which should be noted: firstly, how and why 
Castlereagh's plan failed; secondly, the rise of Talle yrand 
in the estimation of Austria and England; and thirdly, the 
gradual b reakdown of the alliance and why it was happening. 
These must, of course, be observed both separately and con­
currently. 
In underotanding the work of the Congress, it· is 
important to know hov1 it Vias organized. The Congress as such 
wes never convened. Most of the work of the Congress was done 
by contacts ut social functions or at private homes. The 
settlements were made by two committees. The Committee of 
the Four Great Powers, to which France was later admitted as 
the Fifth Great Power, made most of the important decisions. 
The Committee of Eight was made up of the Four Great :Powers 
pluz the four others who signed the Treaty of Paris. This 
committee wao to approve the actions of the Commi ttee of the 
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F'our and settle other issues not directly related to the 
interests of the Four Great Powers. In addition to the major 
committees, ten others were appointed. For thin paper, the 
German Committee is of primary importance. It was composed of 
five German powers and was to decide affairs relative to the 
German Confederation. Later in Dece�ber 1814, a Statistical 
or Population Com ittee, composed of representatives of the 
Four Great Powers and of France, was called to settle popu­
lation questions involved in the Polish-Saxon dispute (this 
committee will be discussed later).19 Even these committees 
d.id not assume a truly.formal assembly during most of the 
early period of the Congress. 
In the beginning, Talleyrand projected that he would, 
in combination with the smaller powers, be able to be a true 
force in the decision making in an open Congress. However, 
if the Congress did not meet in open session, Talleyrand's 
effectiveness would be considerably reduced. For this reason, 
at first, Talleyrand was quite insistent upon a convening of 
the whole Congress.20 
The Great Powers (Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia) 
held their first semi-formal meeting on September 30, 1814. 
l9c. K. Webster, � Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 
(London Oxford University Press, nd), pp. 73-77; and Harold 
Nicholson, The Co�ress of Vienna - A st9� in Allied ¥4�ty 
1812-1832 (New Yo� : ¥he-Viking Press, 1 2)-;-pp. 141- • 
20Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna, October 9, 1814, 
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp. 28-42. 
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This first meeting was for the object of setting up a r:iethod 
for conducting business. Talleyrand was invited to 11assist" 
at this meeting where the preliminaries were to be discussed. 
Tlrr • a T � b d th c:< 
0 h 0 0 t al 0 0 t d 21 monsiP.ur .e .ua ra or, Le .)pm11s nu n::i..s er, wao so 1nv1 e • 
The meeting was opened by Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh 
suggested to Talleyrand that he take note of the protocol which 
they ho,d all signed earlier and which did not place F'ra.""lce in 
a position of power ( all' being Russia, Prussia, Austria and 
England ) . Talleyrand took note of the protocol and immediately 
began hio firn"t assault which wao to last until the final 
brealtdown of the old uilia.nce. The protocol included the 
numerous inclusions of the word "allies," and Talleyrand 
imi"!lediately aslced why the word appeared. He reported that 
he hn.d been told by the "allies" that they had used the word only 
for the sake of brevity, and he replied that brevity wes no 
excuse for inaccuracy. After Talleyrand had made a few more 
objections to the whole document, the protocol was withdrawn.22 
A second document was then introduced into the meetine;, 
and this document was a proposal on the procedural arrangement 
of the Congress. The declaration proposed the establishment 
of two committees to prepare all of the work for the Congress, 
and then submit their efforts to the Open Congress for its 
21.ralleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna, October 4, 1814, 
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp. 12-13. 
22Ibid., PP• 15-16. 
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a:pproval. Talleyrand requested time to examine the document 
and make his decision.23 
In his letter to Louis XVIII, Talleyrand mentioned 
that the plan of the "allies" was to control all of tho buciness 
of the Congress as they pleased and only permit the other powers 
to approve. The French m:inister observed that even if' he nnd 
the :Jpanish m:ininter were admitted to this c,om i ttee of' the 
Greo.t Power-.J they would be outvoted four to two and woulD .. be of 
little value.24 
Later, Talleyrand was to accept admission to the 
Coracni ttee without the $panioh Irlinister to assist him. "Nhy 
did this change truce place? The ru.1�wer to this question 
partially answers several questions. Talleyrand was going 
to accept admission as a Fifth Power after the Four Powers 
had broken their alliance and become divided against them-
celves. If the Powers were divided two against two, a French 
vote would break the tie. This observation gives insight into 
Tc.lleyrand's policy since, as one will observe, Talleyrand 
wn.s to insist upon the protection of the small powers until 
the position of France was guaranteed, and then one would hear 
no more about convening the Congress us a whole or giving the 
Sfilall powers more representation. 
23Ibid., pp. 18-21. 
24Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, Vienna, October 9, 1814, 
Talleyra.Yld Correspondence, pp. 28-29 and 41-42. 
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Another conference took place a few days later, at 
which the proposed asBembly of the Congress w�s discussed 
and at which time Talleyrand pressed for a.n early asse;ubly.25 
Duringtthe in·�erval between these coni'erences, Castlereagh 
had subinitted a new proposal for the establiGhment of the 
committees. Talleyrand stated that CPstleroagh's proposal 
waD materially no differedil from the first, and he wrote 
his disapproval to Castlereagh.2
6 
While at the conference, which again met at the home 
of Metternich, a very important revelation took place when 
Metternich in anger comJn.ented that the Four had planned to 
settle the Polish-Saxon issue and all the others in their 
ovvn way. 27 This was of course lmovm by Talleyrand and the 
others at the Congress, but the adr.a.ission of it by Metternich 
gave it a more solid state than speculation. 
A third meeting took place two weeks later, the whole 
object of which was to put off the date for opening the 
Congress until !fovember l, 1814. Talleyrand insisted upon 
a few additions to this proposal and then approved it.28 The 
important point of this series of meetings was that in them 
25Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
26Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
27Ibid., p.32. 
28Ibid., PP• 39-42. 
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the 11allies11 attempted to establish, vii th the approval of 
Frn.nce and Spain (in the last two conferences Portugal 
attended at her own inGintence), their domination of the 
Congresn as a whole 1Nhen it finally would meet. 
The plan of the " alliee, 11 hov·.·ever, failed and the 
p mvers rather interestingly after this last meeting which 
took place on about October 8, 1814, did not meet agnin, 
and the Congress went into c.. long period of completely 
private and non-foroal coni'erences. This period of social 
diplomacy las�ed until the middle of December when issues 
on the Polish-Saxon questjon finally came to a head.29 
The reason for thio period was the insistence of the. "allien" 
on nonil'!.terference by France or the other p·owe:cs, and they 
now felt this could be best accomplished if they did not 
hold form.al meetings at which these other P ewers could be 
present. 
l:Iention was made earlier that the Com ittee o:f Pour 
made nll of the important decisions until France was admitted 
in January, but thin committee never received the approval of 
France nor did it make any lasting decisions until after France 
29Talleyra.�d to Louis XVIII, Vienna, December 28, 
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs', Vol. II pp . 377-381; Castlereagh 
to Liverpool, Vienna, January 1, 1814, Webster "The Polish­
Saxon Question" Appendix pp. 89-90; and Cook to Liverpool, 
Vienna., Deceraber 24, 1814, Wellington .§_.D. Vol. IX, pp. 502-
503. 
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had become an important influence.30 
30The issue of Poland was tacitly decided before 
the admission of France to the CoriUJ.i ttec of the Great 
Powers t but it was done with the 8t,7l'eement of France as 
will be seen. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DOftiINATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS 
{.!ONCERNING POIJiliD AND SAXONY BY 
LORD CASTLEREAGH .AND HIS FAILURE 
-17-
If the Congre3s was to be successfully concluded 
the Polish-Saxon question was the one question which had 
to be settled since most of the other decisions of the 
Congreso were contingent upon it.31 
Even before the Congress began, the Powere all 
realized what demands would be ma.de by Russia in P0land 
and Prussia in Sa.-x:ony. At the Treaty of Paris, which was 
made only with France, there was a notable omission of any 
mention of the Polish-Saxon question,32 This is also true 
of a settlement of the Polish or Saxon claims in any other 
prior treaties between the 0allies11 (although the problem 
had been mentioned in the Treaties of Kalish and Reichen-
bach). Great Britain's Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, 
was to express his regrets that the 0allies" had not 
settled the question of Poland between ther.iselves ·before 
they ever got to the Congress.33 
3lThe German Confederation could not be arranged until 
the size and number of the German Powers ·was lrwiovm nJ1d thiz 
could not be known until the fate of Saxony had been decided. 
The fate of Saxony could not be decided until the fate of 
Poland had been determined since the amount of aggrandizement 
for Prussj_a in Saxony depended upon the amount of Prussian 
Poland which Russia received. 
3�see Appendix II. 
3..;Liverpool to Castlereagh, Fife House, September 25, 
1814, Wellington, S.D., Vol. IX, pp. 285-286. 
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When discussionn of the twin disputes over 1\ussiDn 
and Prussian demo.nd� began at the OongresB, the �ttitude of 
Russia wa� clearly drawn by the Emperor since throuch hin 
every action and word he tol� the powers that he was in 
Poland to stay, and he would not be removea.34 The Eoperor 
had in his cupport the backing of the Poles and of the great 
Polish patriot Czartoryski, who later vras less than pleased 
with the outcome.35 Throughout the discussions it wns 
nentioned in the correspondence of both TalleyrWld and 
Castlereagh t�at they believed the Emperor to regret his 
Polish committal and that he would lil<:e to find a wey out. 36 
Alexander had stated his claims on Poland so strongly and so 
often 2.11d had made so mar� promises that he believed that he 
could not withdraw from his claims and retain a pocition of 
strengt� during the remainder of the discussions.37 
34The Emperor's determination can be oeen in hie 
replie:J to the letters and memora.nd<.! of Lord Castlereagh and 
in hin conversationo with Castlereagh, Talleyrand and otherc 
present at the Congres s . Some of these will be discussed later 
in the paper. 
35c�a.rtoryski, PP• 282-288, PP • 302-375. 
36Liver:pool to Cook, Fife House, December 9 ,  1814, 
Wellington, S.D., Vol. IX, pp. 467-468; and Talleyrand to 
Louie nrIII,-VIenno,, November 17, 1814, Talleyrand Iilemoirs, 
Vol. II pp. 320-330. 
37Alexo.nC.er had made promises to the Poles and to the 
Prucsians, ::md it would have been extremely embarraosing for him 
to back dovm at this point. 
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The Prussio..YJ. po[':i tion on Polc.nd a...'1.d Saxony ,;me less 
clearly dr2.vm, and it in for this reacon that the British 
policy appears rather naive in historiccl �1erspecti ve. Frw::3ia. 
come to the Congren3 prof essi:ng a demand for Saxony and a 
clista�te for the Tsar'o Polish pretensions. Castlereach took 
this as the direction in which Prussian policy could be precsed 
fill.d conducted himself accordingly.38 
Auntria, when the debates on Poland 2.!1d Saxony beGa:n, 
wao in the worst of c-1.ll posoible positions. :3he was threatened 
with destruction of her frontier defenses o:i two borders, and 
she wns uncble to prevent the deotructio:'l of either of them 
una.iued. T�1e only power upon which she could depend, at all, 
wac G t TI •t • 39 ·rea .;.:)ri ain. 
Great Britain, as represented by Lord Cactlerecr.gh, had, 
as Castlere�eh him3elf indicated, no direct interest in either 
the problerac of Poland or Saxony but was able to act ae 
mediutor. 4° Castlereagh accerJted the prote:::taticns o:f tt.e 
mini;;ter (HarC:enberc;) in opr)ooi tion to , , , .. , (. .. �. 
hone:::t. Hie policy followed such <Jn assumption during the 
38Ca8tlereach to Liverpool, Vj_enna, October 9, 1814, 
�'!ebstcr "Tb.e Polish-Saxon C�uention" Appendix pp. 74-75. 
39Prince Metternich., ilemoirs of Prince :.letternich 
177�-1815. ed. Prince Richard Uetternich tr. Mr:.::;. Alexander 
Ne.pier (Nev: York: Charles Scribner's Sona, 1880) Vol. II, pp. 
569-570. 
40castlereagh to the En1peror of Runoia, Vienna, October 
12, 1814, \"lelline;ton S._;Q. Vol. IX:, p. 329. 
-20-
early months of the Congreos. 41 Castlereagh wished above 
all thing::; to esta.blich a balance of pmver on the Continent. 
He saw the moe>t favorable bale.nee as beine an alliance of 
Austria, Pruosia and the other German States thus providing 
a great central barrier between Hussia in the East and F-rance 
in the West.42 Castlereagh, as an inheritance from Pitt, held 
en almost unreasonable fear of the Giant of the East, per­
conified by Alexander r43and an almost equally great fear of 
France because of the r-Bsults of the French Revolution and 
the Napoleoni9 Wars. 44 For the above stated reasons, Castle­
reagh began his negotiations with the stated intention of 
thwarting the demands of Hussia and allying Prussia and 
Austria. If Prussia needed Saxony (even all of it), to make 
ber a powerful barrier to France in the North of Germany and to 
gain her cooperation with Austria, that was perfectly accept­
able to Castlereagh.45 
Talleyrand, representing French policy, did not agree 
41castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, October 9, 1814, 
v;ebster •rThe Polish-Saxon Question" Appendix PP• 73-75; and 
Castlereagh to JJiverpool, Vienna, October 14, 1814, Webster "The 
Polish-Saxon Question" Appendix pp. 75-76. 
42cantlereagh to V!ellington, Vierma, October 25, 1814, 
Castleree..gh Correspondence Vol. X, pp. 173-175. 
43Gulich, pp. 211-212. 
44Thi:::; could also have been c..rl. inr,.eri tn.nce from Pitt but 
wa:::: actually a fear held by all of the Powers. at the Congress. 
45castlereagh to lia.rdenberg, Vienna, October 12, 1814, 
Y.'ellinc;ton,3.D. Vol. IX, pp. 339-340. 
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with Castlereagh ' s  ansessment of the balance of :European 
power. Talleyrend , through his policy, showed his belief 
that the ren.l threat to future peace in Europe was Prussia 
e..nd Prussiun �ilitn.riom. The French Plenipotantiary ' s  hopes 
at the Congresn centered around the abolition of the old 
ctlliance and the destruction of Prussian pretensions in 
Saxony. The Emperor Alexander ' s  Polish schemes presented 
to Talleyrand the indications of a potential threat to 
Au�tria, it is true , but the pri�e importance of Russia in 
Polc:.nd was that it meant the necensity of aggrandizing 
Prussia in Saxony, and . to thia France was opposed.
46 
As the conference began, Castlereagh tended. to 
dominate the dealings for several reasons . Russia had already 
mo.de her claims , and it was for her now to defend her claims 
against those who would wish to taJce them from her. Austria 
was not in a position to lead a diplomatic attaclc either 
against Prussia or Ruszia because she could ill afford to 
malce her position even worse between the two powerc demanding 
her frontiers.47 Franc e ,  up to this time , had not been accepted 
c::.n e.11 equal by the Great Powers and �till had to press for 
her accGptance. If France had tried to take the lead at 
the bec;inning of the Congress , Castlereagh ' s  threat , that 
46Thia ic tacitly ad.laitted by Talleyrand Geveral time::; 
in hie correcponden�e,  but ic mo�t clearly stated in his letter. 
Talleyrn.nd to Louis XVI I I ,  Vienna, N ovember 17, 1814 , Talleyra.."1 d 
Memoirs Vol. I I ,  pp� 322-32 5 .  
47Metternich, Vol . II, PP • 36 9-370 . 
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JJ.l of the powers would turn a.guinst her, would probably 
have been correct . ·'i-B Prussia was seeking support for her 
Saxon claim� . Whether or not the King of Prussia. had already 
uecided to support Russi � ' s  demands, Pru3sia was not willing 
to risk her claim� by advocating a strong policy except in 
her own defensc .49 The lead in the early affairs wao thus 
left t o  Castlereagh who assessed himself, as othera assessed 
him, r::o as the one best suited t o  mediate the problems at hand . ::1 
Castlereagh ' s  domination actually began some time 
before the opening of the Congress when he first Btarted 
to ma]{e knovvn his strong opposition to the Tsar ' s  Poli3h 
pretenoions . The opponition of Castlereagh t o  the Tsar ' s  
scheme was clearly drawn by September 2 5 , 1814, when Lord 
Liverpool wrote t o  Castlereagh of the �"'mperor ' s  scheme , 
11We shsll have a hard fight against public opinion in defense 
of 8Xly arrangements of which the independence of Poland doea 
not now form a part . "  The Prime Miniater goes on to say in 
another part of his letter that it is regrettable that England 
was responcible for starting the idea of Polish independence 
48castlereagh t o  Liverpool, Vienna, October 9, 1814, 
v.·ellington S . D . ,  Vol. IX pp. 323-325 . 
4 9c�stlereagh to JJiverpool, Vien11::.�, October 9 ,  1814 , 
v:e br;ter "The Polish-Saxon Que:::tion II Append.ix, pp . 7 4-75 . Thia 
i:J a different letter than the one noted for footnote number 
48. Cc.r.:tlereagh often v1rote more tl:an one letter in a day to 
Liverpool. 
50wellineton to Cuntle:i:-ec.ch, Pari::.; ,  October 9 ,  1814. 
Castlercrl.€h Correc12ondence , Vol. :? ... , pp. 160-161; ru1C\. CaGtlereu,:_;L 
to the :8'.nperor of Hussia, Vici'LYlH, October 12 , 1Bl4 , Wellilli.�ton 
� D V 1 - - - 3".>C: .:;.·�· ' 0 • .L.11.., :P• C:.. ":J •  
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and now was to defend the partition of i t .  51 Thi;;; indicates , 
rather well, the stand t a.ken by Castlereagh even be:fore .the 
actual Congress vms due to get under way. 
Castlereagh ' s  program for re-establishing the peace of 
Europe and the balance of power in Europe ,  already partially 
outline d ,  consisted of creating a strong and secure Prussia 
and stopping Alexander ' s  attempts at westward expansion. 
Castlereagh ' s  diplomatic progress during the first 
portion o:f the Congre ss can best bE: understood . .  by examining 
the three major phases of his diplomacy : his dealings with 
Alexander dire.ctly; his dealings with Austria and Prussia and 
the attempts he made to unite them; and his dealings with the 
French both through Talleyrand at Vienna and through Welling�on 
in contact with Blacas and Jaucourt at Pari s .  
Ca3tlereagh ' s  dealings with the Emperor o f  Rus3ia took 
the f or-.n of several interviews and memoranda. All of these 
p0rnonal contact8 and memoranda were couched in very con-
ciliatory terms , and yet they displayed a ve�J forceful and 
determined policy on the part of the British m inister. 
The first contact which the British p lenipotentiary 
had with Alexander I was a private interview only a day after 
the arr:i..Y.al of the Emperor at the Congres s .  During the 
interview, Castlereagh proposed to the E!.aperor that Britain 
5lLiverpool to Co.stlere2.{Sh� Fife Houc e ,  September 2 5 ,  
1814, Wellington, S . D .  Vol IX ,  JiP •  285-286 . 
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would :not be indisposed to allowine the restoration of Poland 
on the baois of that country ' s  limit in 1792 · uncler an independ­
ent ;nonarch. 52 T o  the proponal of allowir..g the re�toration of 
the Poland of 1792 under an independent iiono.rch, Castlereagh 
added, "that they took a broad distinction between the erection 
of a part of Poland into a Kingdom merged in the Crown of HuEisia, 
and the restoration of the whole of a greater part into a 
distinct and independent State . " 53 The opinion of the Prince 
Regent on thin iszue, according to Cantlereagh, was that , 
although Britain would favor the independence of Poland, he 
did not feel that such . a  sacrifice could be justly asked of the 
powers involved .  Itu.ssi a '  s Emperor admitted that he was not 
willing to make ouch a sacrifice of the part of the Empire. 
Alexander, although afunitting thut he was unwilling to mnke 
the sacrifice necessary for the creation of an independent 
Poland, still insisted upon nis own demands for the Duchy of 
Waroaw under hin rule aa the minimum that could be given to 
tho Poles. Castlereagh countered this demand by arguing that 
thin would be asking too much of Austria and Prussia. The 
plenipotentiary pointed out that although the King of Prussia, 
through personul loyal ty to Alexander I ,  might not oppose his 
Polish scheme� they were still repUt,�ant to him and also to 
52castlereaeh to Liverpool, Vienna, October 2, 181 4 ,  
\'/ebnter nThe Polich-Saxon Question" Appendix, pp. 71-72 . r- 3 ') Ibid. ,  P• 70. 
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the rest of Zu.rope . 54 The next dey , Castlereagh, neeking to 
:�'llce hin position even more clear, approached Count Ncsselrode 
and pressed. upon him the danger and error in demanding the 
destruction of the Polish front::..ers of Auf;tria and Prussia 
r i::: 
which Russian demanclo for Poland would necessitate.:J ::.>  It is 
clear from the firot contact which Castlereagh had with the 
Emperor that his policy was to be one of reason and straight-
forwardnes s .  
The method of Castlereagh next turned from inform.al 
conversation "{Vith the Emperor to the raore formal realm of 
the personal letter. The letter sent by Castlereagh to the 
Emperor on October 12,  1814 was not a formal memorandlli�. In 
this letter, the British minister opposed directly the pre-
tensions of Hussia in Poland . He diplomatically avoided 
being offensive by couching his objections in the most 
conciliatory of terms when ref erring to his respect for the 
.Zmperor. 56 
Making the most use of his position as a disinterested 
party in the Polish negotiations, Castlereagh pointed out in 
the very beginning of his letter that , "Britain i3 the last 
51�Ibid . ,  p .  10 . 
5 5castlereagb. to Liverpool, Vienna, October 2,  
Webster, "The Polish-Saxon Quention" Appendix, p .  73 . 
not the rn.une letter as footnoted 52-54 . 
56cnotlerea,eh to the Emperor of Ru�sia, Vien.�u, 
12, 1814, Wellington, .2_.Q. , Vol . I.A, pp . 32 9 , 331. 
1814 , 
ThiG io 
October 
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power whose separate interests could be endangered by any 
determination of Your llajesty on the side of Poland • • •  n 
Ca$tlereagh then observed that British policy, although opposed 
to Russia being aggrandized with all of the Duchy of Warsaw, 
"will not therefore • • •  [be] indisposed to witness , even with 
satisfaction, Your Imperia� rna j esty receiving a liberal and 
important aggrandizement on your Polish Frontier . " 5 7  
Ca�tlereagh then went o n  to a series of arguments to 
prove that the :E:nperor would drop at leant a pa.rt o f  his 
claims in Poland . Firet, he pointed out that Alexander could 
"receive an ample pladge of "European gratitude without imposing 
upon your [his] allies und neighbors an arrangement incon-
sistent with the relation::-3 of independent ntateo to each 
other . '' Secondly , Castlereagh reminded the J!;mperor of the 
generous oettlements which he had received in Finland , and 
Persia (these were to protect Russian frontiers ) . He also 
reminded Alexander of the f avornble treaty whioh Russia 
received from the Ottoman Porte because of the interc ession 
of Great Britain. Thirdly, he pointed out that the other 
F.uropen.n powers did not vlish to see the humiliation of the 
Poles but thin could not be at the expense of the dignity of 
the other European powers . Lastly, he argued that , if the 
Congresn of Vienna was going t o  reach a happy and peaceful 
conclusion instead of being, "a ocene of discordant intrigue , 
57Ibid. 
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and a. lawlens ::>cra.mble for power • • •  , 11 Alexn.nder must lead 
the way vvi th a policy of moderation of his demand::; .  Castle-
reagh suggested that the Congress could be a benefic ial one, 
ana. that Alexander could still :-etain most of the Ducr..y so 
long as his neighbors ( Austria and Prussia) retained su.fficient 
frontiers on their Polish borders for protection . 5 8  The total 
policy of Castlereagh both in the preceedinc; letter and during 
the early portion of the Congress was one of modification of 
demands , in order to mold Europe into an acceptable balance 
of power. 
Alexander answered tl1e first lette r  of Castle reagh in 
terms of the righto of a conqueror t o  dispose of the territorieG 
which he had conquered . 5 9 In reply to this letter, Castle-
reagh sent a memora.i'1dum, not a personal letter, to the Emperor 
this tirae using greater firmness. It'lost of his arguments were 
the same as those used in the previous letter, but to these he 
added several other argument s .  The British minister indicated 
directly that the application of the law of conqueGt to Poland 
could only result in the renewal of tho :i."'evolution2.ry spirit 
\Vhich .I!.."'u.rope had labored so long to ::::quelch. By rullying tl1e 
Poles to Alexander, they would be encouz·aged to generate 
58-b ' d  l. l. • 
5 9tremorandum by Castlereach to Alexander. This is not 
a letter and has no dat e .  Wellington S.D. Vol . IX, pp. 3 32-33 6 .  
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revolutions in the ?olich territorien still held by Austria 
and Pru::rnia. His great est argument e..gainst the plans of 
.Ruzoia was suomarized in the accusation that the acquicition 
of the Duchy of 'No.rGrnv vmc in oppoBi tion to the treat i e s  which 
Alexander hud mnd.e with Auntria and Prunsia . Castlereagh 
ndded that Alexander ' s  "moral duty" to the Polee could never 
exceed hin "moral duty" to uphold the tre uti e a  h� had made . 60 
Castlereagh ' s  method of direct com..lllunication with 
Alexander had up to this point produced no nignificant ch2..11ge 
in the Ernperor ' n  determination t o  obtain all of hin desire s .  
The Emperor• s mind vms · not t o  be changed by such exertions, 
but Castlereagh continued to try. 
On October 30, 1814, the Euperor of Ru3sia replied 
to Castlereagh ' s  memorendu;:;i. The Emperor ' z  areuments centered 
cround an attempt to nullify the treatien which he :i.1ad made and 
to c onvince Castlereagh thc-�t nothing would force him to change 
his mind on the oubject of Polnnd . 61 Castlereagh sent a reply 
to the R-nperor. Hov1ever, he had lost most of his hope of 
convincing Alexander to relinquish his pretensions . Cestlereagh 
60rbid. The treaties referred to in thio memora11dum 
art;:) the Treatieo of Toplitz, Hcichenbach, Chaumont and K..alish; 
o.11 of v1hich contain words to the approximation that th8 Duchy 
of Wars&w will be dissolved in a way acceptable to all of the 
:Powers involved. Castlereagh is aoking if it 8hould be acceptable 
to all of the Powern involved for Auctria and Prussia to lose the 
protection of their frontiers . 
61The Emperor of Russia to Cuotlerea,eh, Vienna, Oct1)°'.Jer 
30, 1814, V.'ellington §_.£. Vol. IX, PP• 386-392 
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a.nmvered the Tsar in order to !lave somethin8 concrete with 
which to defend him::Jelf in Parliar.a.ent (which Liverpool had 
62 recO:n..'ilende d ) . Thi!:j letter was given t o  r alleyrand and also 
sent to the King of France becau'3e by this time Castlereagh 
recognized that FrancG was going to be involved directly in 
future di scucn ion3 , end he wanted her support. 
Caotlere o.gh '  n memorru.1dum of November 4 ,  1814 was the 
firmer;t of hiD attacks on the Emperor ' s  Polish pretens ions. 
In the J'.'.lemorandu..u. he refut ed the idea. that treaties are 
abclinhed by r::ucces8 in the field. 63 He went on t o  attacl� 
the claim that Austria ::ind Prussia coul� be cufficiently 
aggra.�dized elzewhcre for their lossen in Poland . Ca8tlereagh ' s  
c ontention was that the que st ion was not if Russia and Austria 
could be aggrandized el:Jewhere , but if they had agreed t o  
such aggranQize�ent in their treaties : To this question 
Castlereagh answered in the negative on the bacis of the previous 
agre e:nents made by the li'our Powers . Finally, Castlere0£h art-,-ued 
that although Alexander might have been perfec tly sincere o.nd 
never endansered Pruocie. or Auotria by his Polish acqui:::>i tion3, 
"it ic not upon personal confidence or upon the life of an 
62Li verpool to CE�atl0reuch, Fife Eous e ,  October 14, 
1814 , Wellington S .D.  Vol. IX, PP• 342-314. 
63castlereagh to the Emperor of h'uosia, Vienna, 
November 4 ,  181 5 ,  Wellington S . D. Vol. IV, pp.  410-416 . 
Alexander had claime1 that the unprecedented success of 
the allies in the war against Napoleon had annulled the 
agreements which the allies had made pr�or t o  this victory. 
-30-
individual that the liberties and security of states should 
be based • • •  "64 
The Emperor 8,f;ain saw fit to anm,·er Castlereagh ' s  
menorandum of November 4 ,  1814 but he refuse d  absolutely to 
budge from his fon'ler position. 6 5  CaE:tlerea,eh gfl.ve up hope 
of changing the Empero r • 3  mind by thi� kind of memora.ndu.4 
exchange . Castlereagh answered the Emperor ' s  memorandum 
of November 2 1 ,  1814 but he held little hope of its havin:; 
any effect . In his reply t o  the Emperor, Castlereagh dwelt 
on the dangers inherent in the Polish scheme s .  He inferred 
tha.t the Emperor ' s  Polish schemes could lec.d to a war. The 
British minister no longer appealed t o  the E.�peror on the 
basis of the injustice of his pretensions .
66 
This letter 
marked the end of the c orrespondence between Alexander and 
Castlereagh. 67 
Castlereagh ' s  direct met�od had failed, but i t  did 
leave him with a record of long and firm oppocition to the 
Russian schemes with which he could defend hi:nself to t!1e 
64castlereagh t o  the Emperor of Rus s i � ,  Vienna, November 
4 ,  1 814·r Wellington .§..Jl. Vol .  IX, pp . 410-416 . 
6 5zmperor of Rus ;:;i�: to Cu..::-:tlereo.gh, Vie:m •. "1.a , Nove:nber 21 , 
1 814, Wellington S . D .  Vol. IX, PP • 44-1-446 . 
66
castlereagh t o  Liverpool , Vienna, tiovcmbcr 2 5 ,  1814 , 
\'i-?.llington S . D .  Vol .  IX , :PP • 451-452. 
67caotlereagh had more confrontations with the E:.1 peror, 
but thera was no more an attem1:>t to convince the I:m:peror to 
give up his Polish schemes but only the hope that they could 
be ;nodified enough to rrw.ke a nettlement possible . 
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cabinet and to the other nations at the Congre s s .  By 
December 5 ,  1814 , Castlereagh considered the Polish issue 
closed in favor of the Emperor, and he only held out the 
hope that Alexander could be convinced to yield upon cl few 
pointn in order to �ake the issue of Saxony negotiable .
6 8  
Ca.ot:i.;;reagh ' s  method o f  dealing with the Saxon 
quostion wac a bit different than that which he employed 
in dealing with Rvssia ' s  Polioh pretensions. Castlereagh 
realized that th� King of Prussia was quite under the 
influence of the Emperor of Ruosia, but he believed that 
he could direct, vd th �he cooperation of Austria, the weak 
Prussiroi monarch to oppose the Russian claims in exchange 
for Saxony. 6 9  
Castlereagh first approached the Prussian monarch 
to discover what hin thoughts were and found him a firm 
advocate of Alexander but not attracted to his Polish schemec . 70 
The British minister then approached Prince Hardenberg, the 
plenipotentiary for Prussia, and offered his views to him. 
Hnrdenberg admitted that he did not agree with Alexander ' s  
Polish ucheme . but that Prussia could not afford to oppose 
the Emperor of Russia unless they had Gome guarantee of being 
6 8
caotlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, Decer.iber 5 t  1814, 
Vlebster ,  .. The Polish-Saxon Question ., ,  Appendix, pp. 81-82 .  
6 9castlereagh to Liverpool , Vienna, October 9 , 181 4 ,  
Webster, "The Polish-Saxon Queotion " ,  Appendix, p .  7 4 .  
?Oibid. 
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supported on the point of Saxony . 71 
The next person whom Castlereagh approached was Prince 
Metternich the plenipotentiary for Austria. The Austrian 
minister had no plan of action and Castlereagh then impressed 
him with the necessity of uniting v �th Prussia to keep HusGia 
from gaining her demands in Poland . 72 
Castlereagh then arranged a meeting between the 
ministero of Austria and l>russia to enable them to discuss 
the proposed alliance of interest directed against Russia. 
This meeting proved that there was a realm of common interest , 
but the two would still. have some difficulty in getting 
togethe r . 73 
On October 22, 1814, Austria sent a formal outline 
of their proposed agreement that Austria support Prussian 
cluino on Saxony in return for Prusoian opposition to Hussian 
pretoncion3 in Poland . Austria agreed that Prussia wan to 
receive most of Saxony, but r>he would not agree to Prus sia 
rece iving Mayence.74 Prussia, although prepared for this 
announcement by Castlereagh, was ups e t ,  but through the efforts 
of Ca.:.:;tlercagh the two parties a.greed to leave Iilayence for 
71Ibid . ,  P •  75 .  
72 Ibid . ,  p .  75 .  
73castlereagh t o  Liverpool, Vienna, October 24 , 1814, 
Webnter, "The Polish-Saxon Question" , Appendix, p .  77 . 
74Ibid . 
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lute� discussion . 7 5  Austria then agreed to permit the 
provisional occupation of Saxony . The provioion of the 
oc cupation was that Prussia support Austrian and British 
opposition to :rus�ian de�ands in Polruid . 76 
Castlereagh had , on October :i.2 , 1814, t;iven hie 
aonent to the provisional occupat ion of Saxony by Prussia 
(:U1d to the conce::;sion o f  Saxony to Prussia upon natisf actory 
zettlement of the Polish question. Castlereach ' o adraicsion 
of the occup�tion and eventual incorporation of Saxony by 
Prussia was ctuted ver-J strongly and clearly. Castlereagh 
wrote ,  
There is no principle in European politics t o  which 
I attach more importance than the effectual recon­
struction of Prussia • • •  We must all cling t o  Prus3ia 
in such a cris i s ,  it is upon her poVler that we must 
look to assemble our� • • •  I feel some individuG!.l pain 
that so ancient a family should be thus s o  deeply 
effected, but I can feel no moral or political 
repugnance to this meanure • • •  
Cuotlereagh then went on to decry the guilt of the King of 
Jaxony , and to admit that , although their V!Gre other offenders 
of the European peace, the King of Saxony vms the worGt . If 
cll the othcrn received leniency and he did not , it v10uld not 
bother him that it was so. 77 
75rbid . ,  p .  76 . 76 Ibid . , p .  77 . 
77 Ca3tlereo.gh to Harr"' ;nberc;, Vie�via, October 12, 1814, 
\'/clliD.£ton S . D . , Vol. IX, PP • 339-340. 
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On oc·tober 20, 1814 , Ca::;tlereach sent a letter to 
Lord Liverpool defending his otand on Saxony ru1d condemning 
the King of Saxony . 78 r.iost of hio condemnation wo.c baced on 
the history of tl:c !{inc; • s loyalty to Napoleon and his refunal 
to risk j o ininc the alli e s  even whe'' tl:e defeat of lfapoleon 
war.:; in night . Th0 mo8t important po.rt of the letter in that 
part in which he defended the Prussian claim 011 Saxony as 
juctified. 
But if it is o.cl.:d tted that the allieo 
are to be compensated, and if this claim is 
specially asserted and admitted in favor of 
Russia, how can Russia be compensated but in 
the Duchy of Warsaw [he was not here inf erring 
that Russia was to receive all of the Duchy of 
V/arso."'' ] ,  and how can she be compensated in that 
Duchy without the Gi>oilation of Prusoia? 
And how can Prussia be indemnified, first, 
for that compensation; and secondly , for her 
exertions and losses in the co!ID!lon cause? 
It is evident that if indemnified at all, 
compen::::ated at o.ll, it munt be from the dom.inion3 
of come other power. On whom then, on point of 
justice , can that indemnification fall GO properly 
as on that power who was the first and chief 
instrument in the dimn.emberment of her stc.ter:>, 
and by subsequent tergi versations , or pu.cill­
animty, or a.mbi tion, of one of the chief cause:3 
of the loc::>es she had experienced in recovering 
parto of them? 
He went on to a.sl\: how Russia. could receive compensation 2.t 
the expense of Pru8zia if "Prussia is not to be compen:Jat ed 
at the expen:::;e of Saxony , th0 ereutest enemy il.:. l..i <�rman.y of 
the com.rnon cau::;e • • •  ?11 Castlercach also claimed that the 
78cactlercagh to Wellington (enclosed to Liverpool ) ,  
Vienna, October 20, 181 4 ,  Wellington .§_.Q., Vol. IX, pp . 
3 5 8- 3 5 9 .  
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Ki1-ig of Saxony lost his rights because of hin criminal 
behavior and ttwhere no rieht intervenes ,  the law of public 
convenience and public utility takeo plac e ,  which cn.n only 
be c ontrolled by motivea of clemency . 1179 
The strong stand of Caf:1tlereagh on Saxony had been 
weakened somewhat by November 11,  1814, when ha informed 
Lord. Liverpool that Prussia, by the exhortations of the 
Emperor of Russia on the King of Pru:Jsia against Hardenoerg, 
h�»d fallen into agreement with Rucsia. The Russian Emperor 
had made similar attacks on Jia:etternich to the Emperor :F'ra.nciG 
of Austria, but Francis had stood firm in support of his 
. .  t 80 :11n1s er. 
Now Castlereagh found it necessary to defend to 
Liverpool the stnnd that he had taken in favor of Prussia. 
His defense of his acti ons was simply ·that he felt that if' 
the Austrian and Pru.asia.� courts could not be brought to 
agrem:ient both Poland and Saxony vrnuld be lost issues . Th.G 
fear he held as to Saxony was not that Prussia would receive 
Se.xony hut rather that, if Russia received, without �trong 
opposition, her demands in Poland , Alexander would use his 
influence to settle the quention of Saxony and thus !na..1\:e the 
R . t . t t . 81 :eussian cour supreme on every L"D.l)Or an lSGue. 
79Ibic"!. 
80castlereagh to Liverpool , Vienna, Nove�ber 11 , 1814 , 
WebGter, 0The Polish-Saxon Questionu , Appendix1 pp. 78-79. 
81Ibid. 
-36-
relations between Austria and Prussia , at least , 
from ITovembcr 11 , 1814. gradually declined until there was a 
co:·1pl0te rupture , becfauce Pruooin. had fallen c01apletely under 
tl.te C.o:�instion of Runoio. caucillG Auctric. t o  turn aeain3t 
Pru.m:d.a • s clai:.aG in Saxony . Castl• reagh continued his attempts 
t o  patch the breal{in& alliance and establish hin German centered 
balance of power, but from this point on fl.in efforts ·were increas-
ingly in vain. 
Pru.snie .. wiching to ac .  mre her claims in Saxony , with 
the c o opera"!;ion of Ruouia, had the administration of Saxony 
turned over to' her by Prince Repnin of Russia. The givi:nt; 
over of formal control of Sa."Cony on a temporary basis Vias in 
accord with the a&reement that the Auctrian ,  Dri t i s!'1, and 
Prunoia...� ministers had made on Cctober 22 , 1814. However, 
Prince Repnin, in �is c irculzr on the Prussian take over 
indicated thn.t it was pemnnent and unconditional and with 
the o.c;reement of Austria and Englai1d. This action produce·�-
a ereat deal of ill feelir.l{; on the pc.rt of both the Austrien 
and 'British m:ini Gterc and reoul ted. in firm notes condemning 
. 82 the action. 
The British Purlia�ent was informed on November 21, 
1814 �y Lord Cactlerea.gh in a letter t o  Lord Liv�r_pool, that 
Auctria now insi8ted that Ru�sia and Prussic not receive their 
claimc in Poland and Saxony . Mette:rnich had caid that Austria 
82Talleyrand t o  Louis XVII ,  Vienna, November 17 , 1814 , 
Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol . I I ,  pp . 327-3 2 9 ;  and Appendix I I I .  
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would rather go to war with vvha.t force she could muster thv.n. 
to see the Ruasians in Cracovie and the Pruosiru-is at Dresden. 
The British plenipotentiar<J still exprecsecl Gome hope of 
compromise , but the hope of an Austro-Prv.ssian cilia.no� vvas 
dead. Relationz between Austria and Prussia had disintegrated 
another step to the point that war was spolcen of by the 
.Austrian cabinet and minister. 83 
On December 5 ,  1814, Castlereagh wrote that he now 
considered the settlement of the Saxon question the important 
issue , and that Metternich had said that he could never P...llow 
Frussia to have all of Saxony against the will of Germany, in 
general , and of his own cabinet and people . Castlereagh openly 
expre s s e d ,  at thin point , little hope of cu1 early settlement 
mid creat fear of a wo.r . Castlereagh \'IC:LG concerned aG to the 
position that England would talce '<Vere a war ·to coue about , 
but he suggested that , at this point , England should avoid 
n.ny alliances.  One can r.; e e  that , by thiD time , the plan of 
CB.Dtlereagh for o.lly.ing Prussia and Austric.t to oppc,oe irussir.1. 
in Polan.a. had been completely destroyed. 84 
The next two weekn produced little except a greater 
dispnrn.gement leading inevitably to o.n open rupture between 
the foraer "allies. u The two weeks bet·ween Deceraber :> ax1d 
83caGtlereagh_ to Liv ..:rpool, Vienno. , November 21, 181,t , 
Wellington S . D . , Vol.  IX, pp . 447-448 .  
84c�stlereagh t o  Li ve!'pool, Vienna, December 5 ,  1814-, 
Wellington Q.�. , Vol. IX, pp. 462-463. 
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December 17 , 1814, when the open ru:pturG finally occurred ,  
8'-contained numerous gropings for a solution. J Prussia offered 
a solution by giving the King of Saxor..y a small kingdom on the 
left bank of the Rhine ; thio was re jected. 86 The demands for 
war grew louder and the hope for S c Gtlement alm.o st dropped 
from the realw of possibility. T�is was the period when the 
ascendancy of Talleyrand , which had been c oming about slowly 
through e.11 of the weeks of the C ongress , began to take 
definite form, and France began to be generally recogpized as 
an importa...�t �ower in the Congre s s .  
The relationship �>f Castlereagh and T alleyrand vvill 
be analyzed in the next chapter dealing with the ascendancy 
of Talleyrand . 
() r;  
(.))Talleyrand t o  Louis A.-VII I  ,. Vienna, December 2 0 ,  1814, 
Talleyrand ��oirs , Vol .  II , pp . 371-372 ; and Cook to Liverpool, 
Vienna, December 17, 1814 , Welli:ne;ton , 3 . D . , Vol. IX, pp. 48�-485 . 
05 - -
° Caetlereagh t o  Liverpool, Vienna, December 18, i.j14, 
Web3ter, uThe PoliBh-Saxon Question " ,  Appendix p .  84 . 
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The 2.scendnncy of Talleyra .. nd took place gradually 
frorn his o..rri val o..t the Congress until he \Vas finally accepted 
· on the committee of the Pour Great Powers. The period of his 
ascendancy can be broken down into ceveral periods. Prom his 
urri val at tbe Congreso until th::� return. of the t'lonarchs frOJ:i 
3uda early in November 1814, Talleyrand made v-ery little 
headway. The period be tween the return of the monarchs and 
December 17,  1814 , when Cactleregh ' s  plan for allyiri..g Austria 
and Prus3ia v1a.!3 a total failure end war wao threatening because 
of the breakdown which was taking place in the old alliance 
bet\'veen Austria, Russia, PrusDia, and England , marked a period 
of increaoing acceptance of Talleyrand by first the Auntrian a11.d 
later the British ministers . The final period of Talleyre.nd ' s  
c,�cend2.l1cy bega...'1. o.n December 17, 1814 when the open rupture 
between Austria and Prussia took place (this will be . explained 
later) . The ascendancy of the Prench minister was , in his 
estimation, complete with the signing of the Secret Defense 
Treaty between AuGtria, Britain and France on Ja..11uo..ry 3 ,  1815. 
Talleyrand ' s  general stand at the Congress had three 
primary ol:ljective s .  He wizhed t o  see the alliance between 
Auntria, Rusnia, Prussia and Great Britain destroyed. Talley­
ra..n.d deoired to malrn France one of the important powers in the 
decision makine of the Congres s .  He winhed to have his principle 
of "let:i t i��c;/ 11 recocnized a..'Yld used in ml?..kinc the settlement::; 
n.t the Congre n c .  
Ta.llcyr:;�ct. • :::.; principle o f  " legitimacy" W:]..O best 
expressed not by T2lleyrand hiooelf but by the Emperor Frc.ncia 
of Auotria when he caid to Alexander I tI�o I'.:1peror of Russia: 
"A Prince cru.1, if he winhe n ,  surrender a portion of his 
dominions ; he cannot give up all of hiz country or all of 
his pe ople . If hG abdicated his right pnsoec to hie legi tim.ate 
heirs . He cannot de�1ri ve them of i t ;  Europe herself has not 
the right to d_o co • .. B? 
The principle of' "legitimacy " was for Talleyrand his 
f ortreoc of connervaticm to protect him from the fear of the 
other powero of French radicalism inherited fror.i. the French 
Revolution and t o  ingratiate hira to Louis XVI I I .  If Tclleyra.nd 
could force a conclusion of the ai'fairs o f  Eu.rope on nuch � 
conservative principle , France vrnuld ago.in be nu.rJbercd among 
the c onservative pov·mrs. In addition to the favorable view 
that the other powers would have of France ,  such ,a principle 
wan best for the settlement o f  the i ::mueo at Vienna in n way 
beneficial to Fre.nce. The main interesto of France wer;; to 
�ee Saxony retained in order to prevent Pruosia from beco:nint; 
overly powerful n.nd a threat in Gernany c..nd too creat a power 
on tho Rhine . He wiched t o  see the kingdom of Naplen returned 
to a Bourbon Prince. What better principle could Franc e apply 
to Saxony than the principle o:f "lr.1gitimacy " so well stated by 
87To.lleyra._nd t o  Loui o XVI I I ,  Vierma, Novei:iber 2 4 ,  1814 , 
T<J.lleyrand Mer:ioirs, Vol . II, p .  3 5 5 .  
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the Emperor of Austria'? Naples is not the dir·oct concern 
of thin analysis.. Briefly , France wished to see Murat , who 
had with the aid of Nap oleon taken over ·the Kingdom of Naple s ,  
ousted, and the Bourbons , who were �c.cording t o  the Emperor 
Q Q  
Francis ' definition legitimate monarchs , reGtore d . u o  
The principle of 11legitimacy , 11 although in apparent 
conflict with the principle of expediency , which oaid that 
Prussia de::rnrved Saxony as a replacement for her losseG in 
Poland and as .Proper aggrandizement for he!' efforts against 
Napoleon, was actually the principl.e of eJCpediency in that it 
was the principle most .expedient for .Prance .. 
One could generally summarize the a.t.i"lbi tiono of Talley-
rand at the Congress as the desire to restore France to the 
position which she had held. in Europe before the l?rench 
Revolution. France would be wise to restore Europe to vn1at 
it had been before the French Revolution. since the Treaty of 
Paris haQ. restored France to approximately such a stat e . 89 
During the first period, Talleyrand appeared to be not 
too successful, but he retained his stand quite firmly and hoped 
for a break among the "allies . "  He attempted, chiefly, to 
qonvince �:Ugland to change her views on s��cony. He also 
attempted to modify the views of Alexander and the Pruz.:siai.'1.c 
and to influence Metternich, but his chief objective was to 
88Nicholson, PP • 192-199 . 
89see Appendix I I .  
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change the view3 of Castlereagh. 
The fir3t atter.1pt::; of Talleyrand to have the Congros:J 
opened ar...d to discourage the domination of it by the "allies " 
haG already been neen in the sec ond chapter . 90 
At the first meeting s ,Talleyrand met with some succeno 
in thwartine the "allied" plan for openly (lominating the 
Congress . The semi-forr.aal meetingG of the PoVIers ceased. and 
the method of Talleyrand, lilte the method of the other powers , 
turned to personal diplomacy. Du.ri!J.6 raoct of this period of 
the Congress , nhen the dealings v1ere dominated by Castlereagh, 
Talleyrand contented himself with remaining \'/ell inf o:rmed on 
developnents and issuing objections to the proposed settle;n.ent 
of Castlereo.gh. L'Iuch of Talleyrand ' s  efforts to convince 
Englroid to chunge her views on Saxony came not directly fron 
Talloyrand but from Paris to Castlereagh via the Duke of 
Wellington who was the British minister at Paria. 91 
Durine most of the early period, Talleyrand made attempts 
t o  influence the other pow�rs , but his me.jar contacts were the 
Sl:!nllar powero especially the Gerr...aan Powers such as Bavarie 
and \'/urttemberg. 92 The French had little Gucce�s in pressinc 
9°suRra, Chapte r I ,  pp . 11-12 . 
9J \'/ellington, S , D .  Vol . IX, (All of the followir.ie lett ers 
are to be found in Vol. l'x. ) Wellincton to Ca:::itlercagh, Pari s ,  
October 10 , 1814, PP• 325-326 ; October 1 8 ,  1814 , pp. 346-347 ; 
October 2 5 ,  1814, PP• 370-373 ; November 3,  1814, PP• 402-403 ; 
November 5 ,  1814 , pp. 417-418; and November 7 ,  1814, pp . 421-4 2 2 .  
921·JUbasaadors o f  the King at the Congresa to the r.Iininter 
of Foreign Affairs at Paric ,  Vienna, September 2 9 , 1814, Tc.llcy­
rand Memo irs ,Vol. II , pp. 225-226 . 
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their principles at first , because England was quite opposed 
to France having aziy important influence at the Congres s .  93 
Castlere3gh approached Talleyrand a number of times but alweys 
in a spirit of guaranteeing that the Jt�rench would not turn to 
the Russians. The British minister was not seeking l!�rench 
cooperation or showing a willingness to modify British views 
in order to be more agreeable to those of the French. 94-
Most of Talleyrand ' s  hopes centered on the Austrian s ,  
because he knew the policy o f  England toward �axony and felt 
that this policy could only be coW1teracted by the refusal of ' 
the Austrians to cooperate . 95 His belief in Austrian opposition 
to the British support of Prussian claillls in Saxony was 
extended beyond the period of the agreement of October 2 2 ,  
1314 between Austria and Prussia. The agreement was to allow 
conditi onal occupation and eventual annexation of Saxony by 
Prussia if she would support British and Austrian opposition 
to Russia ' s  pretensions in Poland . 96 
IIIonsieur De Blacas , a member of Louis XVIII • e cabinet ,  
93�1all13yrand to Louis XVI I I ,  Vienna , October 19, 1814 , 
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp . 70-71. 
94castlereagh to Liverpool , Vienna , October 9, 1814, 
Vlellillbton, S . D . , Vol. IX, PP • 323-325. 
95Am�a;sadors of the King at the Congress to the �ini ster 
of Foreign Affairs at P£>.ris ,  Vienna, October 16 r 1814, Talleyrf.'l.nd 
Memoirs, Vol . I I ,  pp. 255-2 5 7 .  
96Te.lleyrand to Louis XVI I ,  Viem1a, October 19, 1814 , 
Talleyrand Correspondence, pp . 71-73. 
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gave Talleyrand his best support during the entire Congress . 
During the early months , he was of ereat value to Talleyrn:.1d 
because his informat ion to Wellington v;as passed very quickly 
on t o  Castlereagh and gave the British minister greater 
assurances that the policies followed by Talleyrand were 
in acreement with the lrrench Government . 97 
From the very beginning of the Congres3, Talleyran.d 
correctly assessed the Prussian and Russian C ourts as being 
very closely allied on the Polish-Saxon queation . 98 
Thi� recognit�on of their closeness prevented him from making 
the same error which Castlereagh made in attempting t o  gain 
the favor of the Prussians in order ·to oppo�e the Russians. 99 
Talleyrand stat�d at one time that Castlereagh treated the 
queotions of Poland and Soxorcy separately • 100 When one views 
the Congress and its proceedings, one can oee clearly that 
the questions were not , in reality, t o  be treated separately 
since the claims of Runsia on Poland demanded that Prussia be 
reirnbursed in Saxony, and Prusoian claims in Saxony were only 
97supra, Footnote number 91. p .  4 5 .  Wellington ' s  
Dispatches tool{ from two t o  three weeks t o  arrive in Vienna. 
98Talleyrand ·to Louis XVI I I ,  Viem'la, Jepteruber 27 , 1814 , 
Talleyrand Corres:eondonce pp . 6-10 ; and Ambassadors of the Kine 
at the C ongress t o  ihe Minister of Foreign Affairs at Pari s ,  
Vienna, September 2 9 ,  1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I ,  FP • 
225-226 . 
99supra, Chapter 2 ,  p .  19, Footnote 38. 
lOOTalleyrand to Louis �·�III,  Vienna, December 7 , 1814, 
'I'a.lleyrand r�ernoirs , Vol . I I ,  p .  356.  
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admissable when considered as compensation for her losses in 
Poland . 
As early as October 1 7 ,  1814, Talleyrand requested 
Louis XVIII t o  give him the power to make an alliance 
promising military aid t o  oppose Russia and Prussia although 
at this t ime there was little hope that they would be able 
to use this aid. lOl During the interval , before October 1 7 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand had received assurance from several of the 
small German Powers, especially Bavaria, that they would also 
give military support t o  Austria. 102 Talleyrand was , however, 
uninformed about the pending agreement of October 22, 1814, 
between Austria and Prussia on the disposal of Saxony . l03 
Finally, on about October 1 9 ,  1814 , Talleyrand began 
to realize that Castleragh was able to direct Metternich to 
support Prussia on the question of Saxony. Talleyrand 
still hoped that the Emperor Franc is of Austria would resist 
even though his chief ministert Metternich, had in Talleyrand ' s  
opinion fallen completely under the influence of England . 104 
101Talleyrand t o  Louis XVII I ,  Vienr1a , October 17 , 1814, 
Talleyrand memoirs , Vol . I I ,  pp . 258-264. 
102Talleyra.nd to Louis XVI I I ,  Vienna, September 2 9 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand Correspondenc e ,  pp . 1-4. 
l03Ambassadors of the King at the Congress to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at Paris ,  Vienna, October 2 1 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand Memoi;r-s , Vol . I I ,  pp . 272-275 ; and Talleyrand 
to Louis XVIII, Vienna, October 2 5 ,  1814, Talleyrand l'demoirs , 
Vol. I I ,  PP • 275-281. 
l04Talleyr.and to Louis XVI I I ,  Vienna, October 1 9 ,  1814, 
Talleyrand Correspondence , pp . 71-73 
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Just before the Emperor Alexander left for Duda. on 
October 30, 1814, Talleyrand had an interview with him, and 
as a result of this he lost all hope of modifying the claims 
of Rus sia or Prussia except by tJ. .. e threat of force. The 
interview which Talleyrand had with Alexander showed the 
Emperor to have no inclination toward modification of his 
claim!3 , and Alexander added that he assumed hi:nself to be 
King of Poland and the King of Prussia to be King of Saxony .
l05 
Until the return of the sovereigns from Duda, Talley-
ro.ntl • s  effect had been barely negligible . Be had gained 
sor,1e support from the small powers, but this could be of' 
little use since all of them together could not counteract 
106 the �ims of Alexander alone . 
The first indication of a change taking place in the 
aligrunent of the powers came almost at the same time from 
both England and Au8tria. F1 etternich insisted to the other 
Great Powers , on or about November 6 ,  1814,  that Austria could 
never agree to the defiles of the Saale falling into Prussian 
ha11da . Metternich also told Talleyra�d privately that a 
council of state had taken place in Austria, and it wa3 
decided as a matter of policy that S?...xony wo.s of more importa.nce 
to Austria than was Poland . Metternich said that he hoped to 
l05Talleyrand t o  Louiz XVIII, Vienna, October 2 5 ,  1814 , 
Talleyr2.nd Correoponden c e ,  p .  88. 
106Even Louis XVIII realized that the mn&'.ll powers 
nlone were not enough and that at lem.>t one Greo.t Power was 
needed. Loui� XVIII to Talleyrand , Paris , October 14 , 1814, 
Talle�rrand Correspondenc e ,  P •  5 5 .  
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save between three-fourths and four-fifths of Saxony and that 
this VIOuld be a great accomplishment for justice and the 
general go oa . 107 Castlereagh reported to Liverpool at this 
time that the King of Prussia had fallen under the complete 
in:fluence of the Emperor of Russia.108 Talleyrand wrote to 
Louio XVIII that Castlereagh had told him privately that he 
still hoped to gain the support of Prussia in modifying the 
views of Russia by offering her from four to five hundred 
thousand inhabitants in Saxony109(castlereagh had already 
promised Prussia a.11 of Saxony if she would cooperate in 110 
thwarting the deillands of Russia) . 
Taileyrand tended t o  be come a bit too optimistic 
when he received the information relating to the Polish-
Saxon question from Castlereagh and Metternich. The good 
news also caused Talleyrro1d to become quite self-glorifying 
in a letter to Louis XVIII . 111 The over-optimism and over_ 
assessment of Talleyrand of his role in the expected break 
lO?Talleyrand to Louis XVII I ,  Vienna, Nove111ber 6 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand �moirs , Vol . I I ,  PP • 300-305.  
108castlereagh 1:0 Liverpool, Vienna, NoYember 11 , -1814 , Webzter, "The Polish-Saxon Question" , Appendi:>: pp. 
78-79. l09Talleyrand t o  Louio XVI I ,  Vienna, November 6 ,  
1814 , Taft�yrand Memoirs , Vol . I I ,  p p .  300-301 • 
.J0antlerea.gh to Hardenberg, Vienna, October 12 , 
1814 , Wellington S . D . , Vol. IX, PP • 339-340 . 
lll,..:: --.lley;and t o  Louis XVIII, Viennn, November 6 ,  
1814 , Tall.< ,f!'2..i."'ld M:emoirs , Vol. I I ,  PP • 304-305. 
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be·tween the "allies' has caused. some historians to disregard 
the contribut ions of Talleyrand . Talleyrand did have to 
pleaae the King , and he did overvalue his contributions up 
to this point ,  but he was still to have an important and 
strong impact on the dec isions of the Congre Gs . One cannot 
disregard the French minister because he tended to be 
excessively self-glorifying and op·timistic at some points 
during the Congress . 
Vfhile Talleyrand was making headway at the Congres s ,  
Blacas was ma.¥=ing progress at Paris . He reported to Talley­
rand that he had recommended an alliance to Wellington in 
order to oppose the desires of Russia. Blacas said that 
he had offered this alliance after Wellington , as usual 
insisted that the important point was Poland , and if Runsia 
could be kept out of Poland, Prussia would 11.av-e little claim 
to the whole of Saxony . Although the overture by Blacas wa.s 
not accepted, Wellingt on was now, at least , beginning to look 
more to France for support. 112 Blacas noted in his letter to 
Talleyrand that Castlereagh • s  instructions were not bein.g 
well followed judging from the information furnished by 
Wellington ll3 (Castlereagh probably wrote his own instructionG , 
but if he did not they were so sparce and general that he could 
112The Comte de Blacas D ' Alupo to Talleyrand ,  Faria ,  
November 9 ,  1814 ,  Talleyrand Memoirs, Vol. I I ,  pp . 305-308. 
ll3Ibid . ,  p .  308. 
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hardly have been bre::>Jcing them} . Wellington reported to 
Castlereagh about the c onversation which he and Blacas · had 
had. Wellington also reported tha·t Blacas had been quite 
critical of Talleyrand and. that Talleyrand had been sent 
inatructions to cooperate more with Castlereagh. 114 
A few weeks after the discussions between Blacas 
and Wellington had taken plac e ,  both Talleyrand s.nd .Castle-
reagh wrote that there had been a change in the tone of the 
other and each credited it to the instructions that had been 
sent to his c.ounterpart . 115 Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII 
and stated that Castlereagh had been instructed to support 
" 116b t c tl h ' d h . t t "  .Jaxony , u as ereag never receive sue _ ins rue ions . 
Castlereagh wrote to Wellington and commented that Talleyrand 
no longer thwarted him as he had , and Castlereag:t. thanked 
the French court , believing them to have sent Talleyran.d 
instructions. 117 Talleyrand like Castlereagh also did not 
114vtellington to Castlereagh , Paris , November 5 ,  
1314 , Castlereagh Correspond�nc e ,  Vol .  X ,  pp . 183-185 . 
ll5castliereagh .t o Wellington, Vienna, Nove!'llber 2 1 ,  
1814 , Castlereaeh CorresEondence ,  Vol . X ,  pp. 205-206 ; and 
Talleyrai .. d to Louis XVIII, Vienna, December 7 ,  1814, Talley-. 
rand Memoirs , Vol . I I ,  pp . 354-357. 116Talleyrnnd to IJcu.is XVIII, Vienna, December 7 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol . II,  pp . �54-357. 
117castlereagh to Wellington, Vienna, November 21, 
1814. , Ca:Jtleroagh Corres;po;ndence , Vol. X, pp. 205-206 . 
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receive instructions. By the time Castlereagh and Talley-
rand wrote their letters that the other was cooperating, 
the interests of the two had grovm clone enough together that 
thej' could begin to agree .  The slight misunderstanding of 
each about the instructions of the other did greatly facilitate 
the dealings of the two men. 
Between the timf? that the letters to Castlereagh and 
Talleyrand werG sent from .Paris and the time when they were 
received , there was much happening to the poaitions of France 
nnd England. On about November 12 , 1814 , Talleyrand found 
out fro� Metternich the details of the agreement of October 
22 , 1814 in which Austria conceded to support Prussia ' s  
Saxon claims in exchange for Prussian opposition t o  Russie ' s  
Polish d.emand3 . 118 Fortunately, this agreement had been 
contingent upon the cooperation of Prussia in ousting Russia 
from Poland . Metternich also told Talleyrand that he was 
willing to yield a great deal in Poland but not in Saxony . 
Talleyrand interpreted this as be ing an admission by Metternich 
that he would submit to the der!lands of Alexander. 119 
Alexander had been trying for some time to contact 
Tnlleyrcmc: , and , just prior to November l 7 ,  1814 , he had �ent 
Czartorys;<:i to talk t o  Talleyrnnd. Czartoryski approached 
Talleyrand but the French minister refuzed to have any unusual 
118Talleyrand t o  Louis XVII I ,  Vienna, Hovember 1 2 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. II, pp . 311-315. 
119Ibid. 
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120 dealings with the Tsar. Soon thereafter, Alexander saw 
Talleyrand personally at a party and made an appointment to 
see him. 
Talleyrand , when he ke pt his appointment with the 
Tsar, said he found him more agreeable ·than h� had been 
previously. During their conversation, they discussed the 
Polish-Saxon question. 121 
During the conversation with the Tsar, Talleyrand 
admitted that he was not much interested in the PoliGh 
que stion and that when Prussia and Austria were satisfied 
he also would be . Talleyrand did infor.n Alexander I that he 
wn.s in favor of an indb:pendent Poland aYJ.d th.at he would 
support such . Alexander admitted that a.n independent Poland 
was an impossibility. Talleyrand . indicated to the Emperor 
that he would have to support Austria until she had come to 
t • ti Ru . 122 an a5reemen wi .n ssia. 
'l'alleyrand inforn1ed the Tr�ar, d.uring their con-
varsation, that he was most concerned about Saxony . Alexander 
offered to cooparate in Naples if Talleyrand would cooperate 
in Saxony. Talleyrand answered that they had no point of 
120Talleyrand to Loui3 A-VIII, Vienna, November 17, 
1814, Talleyrru.1.d �iemoirs , Vol. II , P •  320.  Talleyrand had 
been requer:ted by Czart oryski to :make an appointment v;i th the 
Tsar through an unusual sourc e ,  but Talleyrand feared that this 
\�./oulcJ. create suspicion on the part of England and Austria. 
121Ibid . ,  PP • 321-326 . 
122Ibid. 
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di3agreement in Na:ple::.;. The Emperor f'inally said that he 
had given his word t o  the Prussians , and he could not break 
i t .  Talleyrand suggested that Alexander return some of the 
Polish terri tor<J which he claimed t o  Pru.ssiu in order to 
c onvince Prussia t o  relinquish part of her claim in :;:;axony 
so that a portion of Saxony could remain an independent 
kine;dom. Alexa..11.der I conside red this a very singular 
proposal . Finally , Alexander admitted that if Talleyrand 
could convince the Pruss ians t o  release him from his promise 
he V/Ould agree t o  Talleyrand • s demands. 123 Later , when 
Talleyrand wrote to the King he optimistically expressed a 
belief that Alexander regretted his commitment , and if he 
could find a way out he would not support the Prunsians. 124 
?rince Talleyrand , just after his meeting with 
Alexander, discovered that Prince von S chwarzenberg, uno"ther 
AuGtris11 minister (who was to become chief minister after the 
fall o:f flretternich in 1848 ) , had just talked t o  AleXCl.J."'lder. 
Schwarzenberg had Vlarned the ErJ.:peror that , if he continued 
following the same polio::,� of persisting in his demands in 
Poland and supporting Prussian claims in Saxony , ther� would 
soo!l be a war. This threat of war mucl1. concerned Alex2..ncler 
and he replied. that if it were :pos sible he would char1ge , but 
123Ibid . ,  PP • 3 24-325 . 
124Ibid . ,  PP • 325-326 . 
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he had gone so far that he could not .125 
Soon after his convernation wi tr .. Schwartzenberg, 
Talleyrand discovered from Metternich that Austria had sent 
troops to the border. Talleyrand becan to hope thc:..t the 
Vienne cabinet was starting to rise fro� its state of 
126 lethargy. 
Talleyrand ' s  hopes for the revival of the Vienna 
cabinet were further raised when .Metternich informed him 
that he had approached Prince von Wreda { the chief plenipotentiary 
for Bavaria) about an allianc e ,  and von W¥treda had agreed to it 
with certain qualifications. He made the following demands : 
firs t ,  that France be included in the treaty; second, "that 
Bavaria should furnish twenty-five thousand men and no more , 
for every hundred thousand that Austria put into the field ; "  
last , that i f ,  "Ene;land granted subsidies to Austria, Bavs.ria 
chould receive a part proportionate to their reopective 
forceu . "  Talleyrand admitted that this would not be lik:elJr 
to tD.ke place soon, but the mere fact that it vm.s bei!".£ 
considered showed that a great chonge had taken place . 127 
A conversation next took place between Talleyrand 
nnd the mini�ter of Saxony. The Saxon minister provided 
' th th . l f P . R . 128 Th ' Talleyrand wi .1. • e circu ar o rince epnin. J.s 
12 5Talleyrand t o  Louis XVII , Vienna, November 1 7 ,  
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I ,  p .  326. 
126Ibid. 
127Ibid . ,  PP• 326-327 . 
123see Appendix III. 
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circular, is sued upon the exchange of Russian and Frunsian 
occupation of Saxony , indicated that Austria and England 
had. given their absolute assent to Prus sia permanently taJring 
(""'f .I- 1 . d 129 over uaxony as a oepara ve tine om. 
The circular of Prince Repnin cause d  a great deal of' 
com.�otion. It caused both Castlereagh and Metternich to issue 
strong statemento in opposition to it . l30 The circular 
aroused Castlereagh to come to see Tc.lleyrand and tell hiCT 
that he wished to settle Poland as quickly as po�sible and 
get on to Saxony which the Austri an ' s considered much more 
important . The circular by Repnin also was the signal for 
Bavaria to declare that they would mB:ke no agreement on the 
Ger.n.an Confederation until the existence of .t he King and 
kingdom of Saxony was guaranteed. Hardenberg, the Pru:::isian 
minister, admitted that h0 could allow the retention of' a 
So.xony of at lea�t one mi],lion in population, but thi:::; would 
not be at all official until the King of Prussia approved 
i t . 131 
Talleyrand at this point , was quite optimi s t i c ,  but 
he v1ar; not yet o.ble to form the alliance .  A fev1 dayn later, 
on :November 2 5 ,  1814 , •ralleyrc:md wrote to Louis quite dis-
couraged with the passage of events iL the recent clays . 
12 9Talleyrand t o  Louis XVI I I ,  Vienna, 1�ovember 17 , 
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol .  II , pp . 327-328. 
lJOibid. , pp . 328-3:]0. 
1 31Ibid. 
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Ca::;tlereagh fearecl the interferences of France c-..n.d, according 
to Talleyrand , felt hi!!!.self otill in lc:F,,,I_,rue with Russia and 
Prussia. Castlereagh did opeak of war if tl�� liussia.ns pa::;sed 
the Vistula, but still he did not want to involve 1'..,ra.Ylce 
milita.rily . 1
32 
The short period of pessimism which Talleyrand under­
went was soon to vanish beca.v.s e ,  on Dececrber 5 , 1814 , Talley-
rand learned several thingc which he considered especially 
good news . 133 The French minister was informed ,  falcely, 
1 "' 4  that Castlere,agh had received orders t o  support Sa.."{ony . J 
Alexender had approached Franc is of Austria to find out if 
Metternich had been lying t o  him about Austri a ' s  determination 
to support the King of Saxony . The Bmperor of Austri� informed 
him that hi:.:> principles demanded that Au.stril:'. support Saxony • 13 5  
Prince ��etternich wrote a letter to the Prur-;aie..ns and ins isted 
that , according to his statistics, no more of S2.Xony thun 
300 , 000 inha.bi tan ts could be added to Prum:; iv.. 
l3G The Pru::.>Gio.n 
l32Talleyrand to Louis A.1iII I ,  Vienn::!., No .. .re::1ber 2 5 ,  
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. I I ,  pp . 158-169 ;  nnd Cu�tle­
reagh to Liverpool, Vienr1a, Deceober 5 ,  1814-, Wellington 3 . D . , 
Vol. IX, pp . 462-465 . 
lJJTalleyrand to Louis x.VII I ,  Vienna, December 7 ,  
1814 , Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. II,  p .  3 5 4 .  
l34-Ibid. 
1 35rb .  d 3 ..: 5 
- i . , P •  ) • 
136 Amb2.ssadors of the Kin(;; c,t the Gongrecs to the 
Minicter of Foreign Affairs at Farin , Vienna, December 14 , 
1814- , Talleyre..nd Liemoirs, Vol. II, pp . 361-363 . 
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portion of Saxony could not , according to I1fotternich, include 
upper Luca ti£� because of the defiles of' Gable (this was the 
route tJ: ... rougr ... Bavaria used by Napoleon in 1813 ) . l3 7 Pinally, 
Alexander agreed to the formation of a �ingdom of Pole..nd 
which could be no larger than one-half the size of the kinGclom 
before the Napoleonic Wars . 13 8 
By December 17 , 1814-1 there was no doubt that the 
alliance had ceased to exist . 139 Castlereagh informed 
I1i verpool that t:here had ·been a diplomatic explosion betv:een 
F:russia m1d Austria. I/Ietternich, in spite of the c onsul tat ions 
of Castlereagh, had sent a letter to the Pru.ssians denying 
all of the ir demands in Saxony . The letter sent by Metternich 
so aroused Hardenberg that he revealed to Alexander the private 
correspondence which he a.."ld Metternich had exchanged concerning 
Pr-us3ian 2.11.d Austrian c onbined opposition to frusnian pre­
tensions in Poland . 140 Alexander v1as incensed by this revelation 
and v:ent to Francis the Emperor of Austria, because the 
inference attached to the revelations of the con1municationG 
l37 Talleyrand to Louis 1.'VIII, Vier.J.1.c. , December 1 5 ,  
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol . I I ,  .PP • 363-36 9 .  
138Ibid . ,  PP• 368-369. 
l39Talleyrc-...nd to Louis XVII I 1  Vienna, December 20, 
1814, Talleyrand idemoirs, Vol . II , pp . 371-372 ; and Castle.­
reach to Liverpool, Vienna, December 17 , 1814, Wellington, 
�·�· • Vol. IX, PP• 483-48 5 .  
14°c · i · t - · 1 v · ') b i·7 asi; ereagn o .LJl. ver:poo , 1 e1121C?.t J e c em er , 
1814 , Wellington, S.J2. , Vol IX ,  lJP •  483-485 . 
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was that Austr·ia had bro1cen faith with Russia. The Emperor 
Francis called Uetternich into the discussion between he and 
Alexander. Metternich then vtas forced to reveal his communications 
vii th Hardenberg which displayed a greater breach of faith on 
the part of Prussia than on the part of Austria. 141 
The Emperors of Austria ruld Russia then discussed the 
issues of Poland and Saxony , aiLd , at this point , Rusoia was 
more conciliatory than she had ever been. Apparently embarrassed 
by the actiono of Prussia, Russia offered Austria the district 
of Ternopole with its 400, 000 inhabitants. Ternapole would 
not help the Austrians on their front ier, but it was the best 
offer thus far made by Russia. At thiz point , Castlereagh, 
142 although the alliance wa� dead, suw some hope for settlement . 
The f orraer allieo had agreed to f orrn a s-tatintical 
com.11ittee to establish how the population of Austria, Prussia 
and Russia could best be restored to that of the period I'rior 
to the Napoleonic Wars . The statisti cal committee ' �  chief 
concern was with the population demand of Prussia in Saxony 
and Russia in Poland. Castlereagh presented the plan for a 
statistical com1J1ittee to Talleyrand , and Talleyrand approved 
of it wi-Ch the demand that li"'rance be seated on the corn.ini tte e .  
Prussia objected t o  the seating of Fra.l1ce on the conu11i tte e ,  
but Castlereagh demanded aJ1d received approval of the seating 
14l�bid. 
142:rbid. 
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of o. French representative . Talleyrand had threatened to 
leave Vienna if one of his ministers was not placed on the 
com.ini ttee. 14 3 
The statintical committee was composed and convened 
about December 24, 1814 , and, when a Frenoh rn.inister was 
accepted on this committee to deal with the Four Great Powers 
as an equal , Talleyrand had won a major victory .144 Although 
the alliance was broken bef'ore the French minister was placed 
on the otutistical committee, the placement of the French 
ninioter on the committee was an official recognition of 
French power and the right of France to deal as an equal 
\•1i th tho Great Powers, 
Castlerengh informed Liverpool on December 25, 1814, 
that he had had a discussion with Talleyrand and that Talley­
Fcllld had been very urgent in his request for on alliance. 145 
Castler0ach had at this t ime not decided upon the necessity 
of an alliance, but he did admit the importance of French, 
Austrinn, and Britioh cooperation on the matter of Saxony . 146 
143coolt to Liverpool, Vienna, Dece:.nber 24, 18l11r, 
Wellint;ton, S . D. ,  Vol. IX, pp. 502-503 ; Talle.:y:rand to Louis 
x-VIIIA Vienna,
-December 28, 18147 Talleyrand 
Llemoirs, Vol. II , 
pp . 317-379 ; and Ambassadors of �he King at the Congress to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Paric, Vienna, :::>ece:nber 27, 
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs , Vol. II,  PP •  374-375 . 
144Thii3 hacl been Talleyra ... "'1.d ' s pri2:i.ury aim sir.:.ce the 
beginning of the Coneress. Sul:Jra., Chapter I ,  p .  8 .  
145cantlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, December 25, 
1814, Wellin�ton, G.D. , Vol. IX, P•  511. 
l46IbiC.. ; �d Talleyre.nc1 to Louio XVIII , Vienna, December 
2 8 ,  1814, Taileyrand Memoirs, Vol. II,  pp . 377-378. 
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On December 2 9 ,  1814, the Powe�s, Au�tria, Britain, 
Ru.soia. and Pru.ssia, cent representative to meet to settle the 
issuez involved with the T�ar ' o  Polinh demands and Prussia ' s  
Saxo:1 pretencions. 147 The British, as well as the French, sav1 
the8e co�..ferenceo ac a hope for the peaceful settlement of the 
in8uea involved in Poland and eventually thoae of Saxony . 148 
However, on Decm:iber 31 , 1814, Prussia, with the support of 
Rucsia, insued a declaration to the assembled Pov1erE:i that , if 
Prussia did not receive Saxony , Russin and Prussia would 
connider the denio.l aG an act of v1ar . 14 9 
Castlereagh, who ,  as i s  pointed out very well by c .  K .  
Webster in ":E.'ngland and the Polinh-Saxon Question , " had never 
before been "bullied" v1hile at the Congreso , was extremely 
upset by the Prussian and Russian ultimatum, antl went to T�lley-
rand sugge3ting un alli ance between Austria, France und Great 
Dri tain. l50 In o. letter to Liverpool on January l ,  1815, he 
defended hie proposal of an alliance :  
l47metternich Memoirs, Vol. I I ,  pp. 5 65-56 9 .  
l48Ambassadors of the King at the Congreso to the 
Iiiinioter of Foreign Affairs at Pari s ,  Vienna, December 27, 
1814, Talleyrand Memoirs, Vol . I I ,  pp . 374-377 ; and Cantle­
reo.gh ·to Liverpool, Vienna, January 1, l��,15, \''1ebster "The 
Polinh-Suxon Question , "  ApP endix :P •  88 .. 
l49castlerea.gh to Liverpool ,  Vienn�, Jn.nuary l ,  1815 , 
\'/ebster "The Polinh-3axon Question, "  Appendix p .  88. 
l50webster "The Polinh-Saxon Question, 11 p .  6 6 .  
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This sort of principle openly announced in a formal 
conference in the name of two gree:1:t .Powers avowedly 
making Common Ca.us e ,  and having la�ge Armies ready 
to act , has appeared to Us to call for some pre­
cautionar� corrective by which the other Powers may 
be induced to feel that , in the dincharge of their 
functions in Congress , they a.re not exposed individually 
and in detail to the destructive Effects of such a 
comineering dictation. Under these Circumst�.J.1ces I 
have felt it an act of Imper�tive Duty to concert with 
the French and Austrian Plenipotentiaries a Treaty of 
defensive Allie.nee , confined within the ntrict necensity 
of this mofft Extraordinary Case .  151 
Talleyrund wrot e  to Louis A'VIII on January 4 ,  1815, 
and in the ut!l'ost jubilation told him of the contraction 
le: " of the alliance . :1 .... He mentioned the fact ·that Castlereagh 
brought the alliance to llim and that it was acceptabl e .  
Talleyrand ' s  greatest jubilation was over what the alliance 
meant . 
The spirit of the coalition and the coalition itself, 
had survived the pe ace of Paris.. r!Iy correspondence 
up to the present date offered numerous proofs of i t .  
I f  the pro j ects that I found established. here on ny 
arrival, had been put into execution, France would have 
fo1.ll1d herself, for some fifty years , isolated in Europe 
without friendly intercourse with a single power. All 
my efforts v1ere directed to preventing such a miofortune ; 
but my most sanguine hopes never went s o  far as t o  lead 
me to expect c omplete suc c e s s .  
But now, sire. the coalition is destroyed, and 
destroyed forever. Not only is France no longer 
isolated in Europe ; but your Majesty has already a 
f edere.l sy3tem cuch a.s fifty years of negotiationn 
held out no prospect of giving .. 153 
l51castlerengh to Liverpool , Vienna , Jn11uary 1 , 1815 , 
Webster "The .Polish-Saxon Question11 Appendix p .  88. 
l52Talleyrand t o Louis Jf\JIII , Vi0nna, J2WJ.uary 4 ,  1 81 5 ,  
Toileyra.nd Memoirs , Vol. III, pp. 385-3 8 6 .  
153Ib ' d  "' 86 J.. . , p • .) • --
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Talleyrand went on, in his letter to Louis XVII I ,  to 
credit the success of the French at the Congres s  to God and 
some other factors especially him�elf • ·  
After God, the efficient ca.uses of this 
change have been the following: 
My letters to Prince Metternich a:nd Lord 
Cantlereagh and the imprem:dons they produce d :  
The hints dropped t o  Lord Castlereagh 
re la ti ve to an agreement \Vi th France • • •  ; 
The care I have taken to quiet hie suspicions , 
by showing , in the name of France ,  the most perfect 
disinterestednes s ;  
The peace with America, which • • •  has left him 
more free to act ,  and has given him more courage ; 
Fina.lly 1 the claims of Russia and PTU3sia • • •  ; 
and, above all , the tone in which the claims have 
been advanced and sustained in a conference between 
their_ plenipotentiaries and those of Austria. The 
arrogant tone t�iken in this shameful and prepocterous 
document [the threat to go to war if Prussia did not 
get Saxony] so wounded Lord Castlereagh that , for­
saking his habitual calm, he exclaimed that the 
Russians were claiming to lay dmvn the law , and that 
England ·would accept it from no one . 154 
The ascendancy of Talleyrand especially in his own 
opinion, was complete \Vi th the signing of the Secret Treaty. 
From this point to the conclusion of the affairs of both Pol8.l1d 
and �'Jaxony , the dealings were to have a different complexion. 
The 3:Ldeo were now clearly drawn. France was to be in allia..'1.ce 
with England and Austria, and . their opponents were to be Runsia 
and Prussia. The sympathies of most of the smaller powers were 
to lie with the three new allies l'.'ather than 'Ni th the powers 
of the north. 
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The rise of Talleyrand can be credited to a number of 
factors . Baoioally, Talleyrand was correct in his assessment 
of the reazonc for his success at the CongreG s .  The chief' 
ca.une of Talleyrand ' o  ascendancy , which was omitted by Talley-
rand , wns that circ1.lmstances had done raore to place hi� in the 
poci ti on of an e<iuul ·than all of hit:> own efforts. Talleyrand 
muct not be dincredi ted in his rise ; he ·took full advantage of 
all favorable changen of c ircumctance , and he did all in his 
power to implement the brealc up of the old alliance without 
going too far and getting France placed completely outside 
the c onfidence of the ''allies:• One of Talleyrand • s greatest 
pointo of favor was that he held firm to his stated principles 
o.nd did not allow them to be changed or compromised without 
ntronc cause . After Talleyrand had accomplishe<l his major 
c;o3l of destroying the old coalition a.gain.st Franc e ,  h e ,  as 
i··5 
c .  K. Webster wrote , "did not strike a ha.rd bargain. " ::::> 
The fact , that Talleyrand VJas williP..g to compromise 
D..fter the coalition was destroyed and the position of France 
guaranteed., proves that the French minister ' s  principles were 
u::>ed because they v1ero the best , in his est imation, for aidine 
in. the redevelopment of Frc.rw e .  Once the security of France 
was guE:.ranteed , Tcllcyrru:1d ' s  principles could be bent a £reat 
ce::..i . 
155webster, "The Polish-Saxon Question , " P • 62 . 
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Austrin, Great Britain nnd France signed the secret 
Treaty of Defenae on January l ,  l815. l56 After the signing 
of the treaty, the threat of war although still current began 
to subside . The powern now aligned clearly could make their 
demands a.'Yld conceusions in a more positive manner. 
The powere agreed to the admission of Frs.nc e  to the 
committee of the Great Powers and , on January 8 ,  181 5 , l57 
France becrune- the Fifth Great Power offically. In order to 
ca.in the 130si tion as the Fifth PoVFer, Talleyrand had to sacrific e ,  
in part , his principles . The Powern of the Committee of Four 
dcilla.nded that Talleyrand accept their conclusion that the 
decision8 on Saxony would ba made with no reference to the 
Xi!l£ of Saxony , and that if the King did not accept their 
decisions, Saxony would be placed under a provisional govern-
mcnt . Talleyrn.nd did add that tho only thing which would 
finally make the decisions on Saxony legaJ. would be the 
conGent of the King, but he did finally agree to admit their 
qualificution. 15 8  
'J'.he question of Poland vm.s tacitly settlea. between 
January 8-11 , 1815. The Emperor demanded all of the Duchy of 
156sec Appendix IVa 
l57Metternich Thiemoirs, pp. ::>G0-::;69. 
l5Bibid. 
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Warsaw except GenGen and Pouen; some · part n of old Prussia which 
he VIOuld give to Prussia; a mnall territory on the right ba.."'1..k 
of the Vistula which he would give t o  Austria ; and Gracow and 
Thorn vfl1ich were to bec ome free cities . The demands of 
Alexander v1ere allowed with no discussion by the Five Powers. l5 9  
Alexander did agree later t o  permit Thorn to go to Prussia in 
order to convince her t o  agree on Saxony, and so Thorn did not 
become a free ci ty .
160 
T:h.e final decision on Poland wao not reached until 
Februc:i.ry 11, 1815 , but there was no material change at that 
tirae . As a result of the official agreement Alexander received 
127, 000 squarP. kilometers and 3 , 200, 000 people of the old Duchy 
of Warsaw to be set up as the independent k ingdom of Poland 
tmtler the Kingship of Alexander I . Prussia retain�d Posen, 
and Austria retained Galicia. Gracow and the �urroundir.,e urea 
waf:l mc::.de a free city of 1 , 000 square kilometers and 95 , 000 in 
1 t .  161 popu a- ion. 
The quention of Saxony , which had been considered of 
grave importance only by Talleyrand at the beginning of the 
Congres s ,  wac now the chief problem and the most thorny one 
to nolve . 
Prusr;ia still demanded all of Saxony , The Prussian 
mininter, Prince .Hardenberg aereed to the grruitine of the 
l5 9Ibid. 
lGO!t'Ietternich Memoirs , p .  576 . 
161tacho1Gon, p .  179. 
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King of 3a.."'Cony a kir.gdom on the left bank of the Rhine. 
Castlereagh believed that thio project was imposoible because 
it \-vould place too weak a power under French influence .  162 
Talleyrand also strongly disapproved of the proposed Saxon 
kingdom on the left bank of the Rhine . 163 The British 
plenipotentiary was most ,pleased with the action of Talley-
rand in renpect to the proposed left ban.le kingdom for the 
King of Saxony. 'ralleyrand stated that al though the plan 
for a left b3l'lk kingdom would benefit any future French 
ambition, he had to re ject the plan because it was wro�o: 
according to the principles of justice and righteousness .164 
The Austrian minister, F.1etternich, was not as opi:iosed t o the 
granting of a left bank kingdom to the Kit1..g of Saxor..y as 
l�e wrw to Prussia receiving Torgau and Erfurth (two Saxon 
fortresses) • 165 
The Austrian cabinet had been expected to off er a 
colLYJ.ter project to the Prussian project which dema.i."'lded all 
of Saxony in exchange for a kingdom of 500, 000 on the left 
bank of the Rhine . The Austrian minister finally did offer 
162castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, Ja..YJ.uary 8, 1815,  
Webster "The Polish-Sn..."{on Question" , Appendix pp . 90-91. 
163Talleyrand to Louio XVIII ,  Vienna, January 6 ,  181 5 ,  
Talleyrand Correspondence , pp . 249-252. 
16 4castlereagh to Liverpool , Vienna, January 5 ,  1815 , 
Wellington S . D . , Vol. IX, PP• 527-�28. 
165�a;;tlereag_h. to Liverpool, Vienna, January 22, 1815,  
Vlebster ''The Polish-Saxon Questim:1 f! '  Appendix P •  93 . 
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o. ccunter pro ject but only after great modification8 had 
tPJcen pluc e .  Auctria ori�ino.lly v1ished t o  deny Pru.3sia the 
fortres3es of Torgau a.11d Erfurth, but Ca.stlcreaeh demanded 
th�t thene remain or he would vii thdraw from the alli2..nce 
they had recently formed with Franc e .  Austria finally bowed 
to the de�ands of Cantlereagh and did no t domand tho two 
fortreo s e s ,  but they did refuse to permit Prussia ·to talce 
1 . . 166 ei:psic. 
Talleyrand had been aware of the Austrian demands and 
syr.ipathized with them, but he also a{;I'eed to nave theo 
modified. Tnlleyra.nd , however, vms not too happy with his 
now allies a.nd wrote to Louis XVIII that Mette:tnich was weak, 
and Castlereagh had supported the Prussia.n side t oo long. 167 
Finally, a prop osal \r;as submitted to Prussia by Austrir.!. 
and England, and it did perz:ri t Prusoia · to retain Torg£'�U and 
'Erfurt!1, but it -r.efused Leipsic to the Prussians. Castlereagh 
knew that Leipsic was of great importance to Prussia ac a priz e ,  
b � h � · d � r i th t · t i a · 1 ·  · 1 f · h  163 u"t.. e 1..: 1 no-.., ee a i 1 a . rni 1 -c;n.ry va ue or 't 0 1:i .  
Cuctlercv,,gh deniring the acceptance of thin propooul, since 
it was nearing the time for him to leave and he did not want 
to le2.ve a...."1.y of the matters unsettled ,  approached ·the R.inperor of 
166cactlerea.gh to Liverpool, Vienna, Ja.�uary 2 3 ,  1815, 
Webnter "The Polish-Saxon Queotion " , Appendix p. 96 . 
167Talleyrand to Louis XVII I ,  Vienna, January 19, 1815, 
Tclleyrand 11emoiro , Vol . I I I ,  pp. l�--16
. 
168castlereogh to Liverpool, Vienna, Jro1uary 29, 1 815, 
Webster "The Polich-Saxon Question" , A:p13endix pp. 96-97 . 
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Runsia, and Alexaz.�dcr agreed to give Pruss ia Thorn and its 
environs . 169 The offer of Thorn did not satisfy the Prussian.8 , 
and Castlereagn increa�ed his off er by reduciug the demands of 
Hanover by fifty thousand ond permitting the removal of an 
equal nunber from Holland . The Prusoia..� minister was otill 
ver-y hesitant , but re finally accepted. 170when Castlereagh 
prenented the proposal -�o I�1etternich, he s igned without 
hesitation but not so Talleyrand. �alleyrand objected because 
he felt that too great a sacrifice was being demanded on the 
part of tile King of Saxony. In spite of hin objectionn to the 
arrangement for Saxony, the French minister agreed to the 
cettlement because he did not wish to be disloyal to his nev1ly 
made alliea . 171 
The final proposal for the settlement of Saxony was 
a.zrccd upon February 6 ,  181 5 .  The settlement finally arrived 
at gave 8axony and her Kine about one-half of what she had 
originclly had with oo:nevihc.t more in population; Pru.ssio. 
received tho larger BOographic portion of Saxony but a smaller 
population than the King of Saxony retaine d .  Also included in 
the nettlement of Saxony , Prussia received Thorn and the area 
surroimding it. 172 Talleyrand was not happy \'Ji th the final 
169ca::::tlereagh to Liverpool,  Vier.no.., February 6 , 181 5 ,  
Webster 11The Polish-Saxon Quention " ,  Appendix p .  99. 
l?Oib ' � 99 100 �-i a_· . , PP• - • 
l7libid . , pp . 100-101 . 
172rnetternich Memoir.§!., Vol. II , pp . 576-577 . 
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settlement , but he stated that it was the best that could 
be gained without war, and he was satisfied that f>a.xony 
did , at least , still remain as a third class power which 
she had been before. 173 
l73Talleyrancl to Louis XVIII,  Vienna, February 6 ,  
181 5 ,  Tall0yrand raemoirs , Vol. III ,  pp . 34-38.  
CF-APTER V 
CONCLU3IOU 
-72-
An n.nalysis of the contributions of Castlereueh and 
Talleyrand can lead one to the falne conclusion that one or 
the other r.um wan of greater importance in the final settle­
nent of the Polish-Saxon question at the Congress of Vienna. 
In looking at this text, one ca.n be led to the opinion 
that Talleyrand wns the most important figure in the settle­
ment . This mioconception of the importance of Talleyrand is 
cauoed primarily because Castlereagh ' s  policy at the be·ginning 
of the Congress met with failure . There io a tendency in man 
to equate success �with pre-eminence, but in the solution of 
the Polish-Saxon question this is not necessarily so . 
As a generalization, other treatments of the Congreos and 
the Polish-Saxon question have tended to emphasize the contri­
butions of one rnru1 over those of the others present at the 
Conv.<Te s s .  Credit for the Polish-Saxon cettlement han generally 
been accorded to either Talleyrand or Cantlereagh . Some have 
credited the settlement to M:etternich. 
Talleyrand and Castlereagh ' £i  contributions to the 
Polish-Saxon settlement were very nearly equal , and to value 
the contribution of one man over tl1at of the other is an error. 
When comparing the contributions of the two men it is important 
to exa�ine their general policies and succeGoes, but more 
important than the policies or thG successes of either individual 
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is the actual contribution each made t o  the settlement . 
Ca8tleree.gh placed Austria n.nd Prussia as allies, 
but at this time they c ould not become permanent allies 
because of the Gerr.io.n rivalrJ and ·Ghe ascendancy of Prussia 
which would in the next fifty years completely replace 
Austria as the most important and powerful German State . 
Castlereagh led the discussion of the Cone;ress on the Poli::::h­
Saxon question on the impossible path of Prus�ian-Austrian 
alli5nment for several months. Even after the obvious 
failure of hif:! attempts to unify them, Castlereagh continued 
to ro.nk high the re-creation of a powerful Prussia. Castle­
rec:..gh sav1 France as the ttll'eat to future European peace and 
Russia as a strong oecond t o  France as a threat. 
Talleyrand recognized the threat of Pru.ssia to both 
Austri� and Franc e .  He claimed the support of principle in 
his dealings , but , in reality , - hi s  principle was primarily 
one of French expediJncy which happened to take the form of 
"legitimacy . "  During the discussions at Vienna, Tulleyrand , 
although thwarted in the early portion of the Congre s s ,  
eventually saw his primar� aim fulfilled. Tn.lleyrand ' s  aim 
\'1as accomplished by the breakdown of the old alliance v1hich 
had been formed to def eat Napoleon and the f orminc of a new 
alliance between Austria, Great Britain and France . This 
new alliance restored France to the po8ition of equality with 
the Four Great Powers in European diplomatic discussions , and 
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this was Talleyrand ' s  primary aim. 
In looking at the relative value of Talleyrand and 
Castlereagh in the Polish-Saxon settlement , both can 
be assesoed the position o f  mediators s ince neither was 
directly involved in the issueo. Franc e ,  certainly, had a 
greater involvement than England since France could be 
directly threatened by a continental war. The individual 
importance of each man can most ea.sily be tmderstood if 
each io assigned a sp�cific function in the settlement . 
Castlereagh ' o  function in the settlement of Poland 
and Saxony, al though misdirected during the .early months of 
thq Congre s s ,  was that of a true compromiser. Cantlereagh 
was the prime motivator of moderation throughout the Congress . 
Du.ring the early months he cen·tered his attempto at moderation 
of the intereGts of Austria on her Saxon frontier and Russia 
in Poland. He also attempted to keep France in the background . 
In the latter monthr: , that led to the final oettlement , he 
moved into a policy of moderating the demand of both Rusnia in 
Poland and Prussia in Saxony . The :problems of modifying the 
demands of Prus!lia and Russia were combined with the problems 
of satisfying Austria for the losses she was to encounter on 
both her Russian o..nd Prus2ian frontiers and moderating the 
demands of Talleyrand for the restoration of moot of Saxony . 
Talleyrand ' s  !unction was that of giving the discussions 
a finn basis on which t o  operate .  Talleyrand brought to the 
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Congress a definite plan for making ·the settlement . He called 
this basis f·or nettlement the principle of 11legi t imacy , "  but 
v�·hether or not his wo.::i a cound principle is of little importance 
since it did provide the needed direction for �� eventual com­
promise . During the early months of the Congres s ,  Talleyrand 
was on the pale of the discussions , but , eventually , he assumed 
the po£:i tion, which l!"'rance deserved to have , as one of the 
Five Great Powers at the Congress . In addition to giving the 
Congress firm directic'l, after the failure of Castlereagh ' s  
attempts at an early settlement , Talleyrand also was flexible 
enough , within the framework of his principle, to permit sufficient 
compromise to enable settlement . The compromising spirit of 
Talleyrand can best be seen in his agreement that the King of 
Saxony not be c onsulted in the settlement of his kingdom ' s  fat e ,  
which was very ne�rly a contradiction of Talleyrru1d 1 s  principle . 
The French mininter 1 s ability and willir.i.gnes s  to compromise can 
alGo be readily witnesced when the actual settlement was made 
on .the Saxon question since the settlement was far below his 
demands for the restoration of the King and kingdom of Saxony . 
The future of Poland and Saxony was settled by the powers 
with rather equal aid from both Castlereagh and Talleyrand. 
Both individuals were indispensable under the circumstances 
which existed at Vienna during t!1e time of the Polish-Sro:on 
disput e .  Talleyrand interpreted Saxony as the important question, 
a.nd it was eventually treated as such. Castlereagh treated the 
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PoliGh question as the most impo:ctant one but was willing 
to benr1 when circuraste..nceo made obvious the real ity that 
Saxony had be cone for the continental powers the issue most 
important an� most difficult to zettle. 
The final settlement of the is sue s of Poland and 
Saxony, although not se ttled in necessarily the best con­
ceivable rarumer or in o. · way completely pleasing to the powers 
involved , v;as , et least , settled satisfactorily enough to 
help provide the foundation for the balance of power that was 
to prevent Europe from having another Euro!>ea.n wide war for 
a century . The balance of power was to chruige 0ften in the 
comine hundred years but the Congreso of Vienna did provide a 
firm and yet flexible enough base to prevent another general 
explosion. 
The ::::ettlement of the Polish-Saxon question wa:J the 
post import ant settlement made at Vienna because without it 
the Congre so could never have been satisfactorily . concluded . 
Talleyrn.ncl ru1.d Castlereagh were the prime figu:res in the 
attainment c£ a sat isfact ory , but no"t perfect , settlement of 
the Polish-Saxon issue , and they were both inextricably 
c onnect ed with making such a settlement poooible . Neither of 
these men can be credited with nore importance than the other 
in the malcing of the oettlement and yet together , althouch 
perforr!ling quite different functionn and often o.ctinc in 
opposit ion to each other, they were the prime determinnntc of' 
the settlement . 
APPENDICES 
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A TREATY O�' UNION , CONCERT , AND 
SUBSIDY , BETWEEN HIS BRIT�""NIC 
MAJESTY AHD HIS IIIAJESTY THE 
EMPEROR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS. 
SIGNED AT CHAUl''l!ON T ,  THE lST OF' MARCH 
1814 
In the �rune of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity. 
Hin Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of All the RusDias , 
His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty the Emperor �f Austria, 
King of Hungary and Bohemia, and His Majesty the King of 
Prussia, having transmitted to the French Government proposals 
for concluding a general pence, and being desirous , should 
France refuse the conditions theroin contained, to draw closer 
the ties which unite them for the vigorous prosecution of a 
war undertaken for the salutary purpose of putting an end to 
the miseries of Europe ,  of securing its future repose , by 
re-establishing a just balance of power, and bring at the s&�e 
tir.ie desirous, should the Almighty bless their pe,cific in­
tentions, to fix the means of maintaining, against every 
attemp t ,  tho order of things which shall have been '!:he happy 
consequence of their effort s ,  have agreed to sanction, by a 
solemn treaty, signed separately by each of the four powero 
with the three others , this twofold engagement . 
In consequence , His Majesty the King of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has nai:ied to discus s ,  
settle , and sign the conditions o f  the present Treaty, with 
His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, the hight Honourable 
Robert Stewart , Viscount Castlereagh, one of His said Majesty ' s  
Most Honourable Privy Counc i l ,  Member of Parliament , Colonel 
of the Londonderry Hegiment of Militia, &."ld His Principal 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs , &c .  & c .  & c .  and His 
Majesty the Emperor of all the H.ussias , having n.ominated on 
his part , Charles Robert , Count de Nessclrode , h..1..s PriviJ 
Councillor, Secretary of Stat e ,  Actual Chamberlain, Knight 
Grand Cross of the Order of St. Wolodimir of the second class, 
Knight of the Order of Leopold of Austria, of the Red Eagle 
of Prussia, of the Polar Star of Sweden, and of the Golden 
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Za.gle of Wurtemberg ; the said Plenipotentiaries , after 
having exchanged their full powers, found to be in due 
and proper form, have agreed upon the following Article s :  
ARTICLE I .  
The High Contract ing Powers above-named solemnly engage 
by the preoent treaty, and in the event of F·rance refusing to 
accede to the conditions of peace now proposed , to apply all 
the means of their respective statP.s to the vigorous pro­
secution of the war against that power, and to employ them 
in perfect concert , in order to obtain for themselves and for 
Europe a general peace , under the pro·tection of which the 
rights and liberties of all nations may be e stablished and 
secured. 
ThiLJ engagement shall in no respect affect the stipu­
lation£ which the several powers have already contracted 
relative to the nwnber of troops to be kept against the enemy ; 
and it i::.; understood,  that ·the Courts of England , Russia, Austria, 
and PrufJsia, e'tlgage by the present treaty to keep in the field, 
each of them, one hundred and fifty thousand effective men, 
exclusive of garrisons, to be employed in active service 
asninst the common enemy. 
ARTICLE I I .  
The High Contract ing Part ies reciprocally engage not to 
negociute separately with the c ollli�on enemy , nor to sign peac e ,  
truce ,  nor convention, but with coomon consent . They moreover 
engage not to lay down their arms until the object of the war, 
mutually u11derstoocl anc.1 agreed upon, shall have been attained .  
ARTICLE III.  
In order t o  contribute in tne most prompt and decis ive 
manner to fulfil this great objec t ,  His Britannic Majesty 
engagetl to furnish a subsidy of five millions sterling for 
the ser\Tice of the year 1814 to be divided in equal proportion�� 
2.lnongst the three powers : and His said Majesty promioes more­
over to arrance , before the 1st of January in each year, with 
their Imperial and Royal Majestie s ,  the further r3uccours to be 
furnishedc durir..g the oubsequent year, if ( 11.rhich God forbid ) the 
war should zo lone continue . The subsidy above stipulated, of 
five millions sterling, shall be paid in London, by monthly 
instalments ,  and in equal pnoportions , to the MiniDter,;-; of the 
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respective powers duly authorised to receive the same. In 
case peace should be s igned between the Allied Powers and 
France before the ex�iration of the year, the subsidy, cal­
culated upon the scale of five millions sterling, shall be 
paid up to the end of the month in which the definitive treaty 
shall have been signe d ;  and His Bri·tannio Majesty promises ,  
in addition, to pay to Russia four months, and to Austria and 
to Pruosia two months , over and above the stipulated subsidy, 
to cover the expences of the return of their troops within 
their own frontiern. 
ARTICLE IV. 
The High Contracting Parties will be entitled respectively 
to accredit to the Generals commanding their armie s ,  Officers, 
who will be allowed to correspond with their Government s ,  for 
the purpooe of informing them of the military events ,  and of 
every thine which relates to the operations of the annie s .  
AHTICLE V .  
The High Contracting Powers reserving t o  themselves to 
concert together, on the conclusion of a peace with France ,  
as to the means best adapted to guarantee t o  Europe and t o  thew­
sel ves reciprocally the continuance of the Peace , have also 
determined to enter, without delay, into defensive engagements 
for the protection of their respective states in Europe againut 
every attempt which France might make to j nf'ringe the order of 
things resulting from such pacification, 
ARTICLE vr. 
�·o effect this they agree , that in the event of one of 
the High Contracting Parties being threatened with an attack 
on the part of France , the others shall employ their most 
Gtrenuouz efforts to prevent i t ,  by friendly interposition. 
ARTICLE VII . 
In the case of these endeavours proving ineffectual , 
the Hieh Contracting parties promise to come to the immediate 
assistance of the power attacke.i ,  each with a body of sixty 
thousand men. 
ART ICLE V I I I .  
Such auxiliary corps shall re3pectively consist o f  fifty 
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thousand infc.ntry and ten thousand cavalry, with a train 
of a�tillery, and l'..11l!llunit ion in proportion to the number of 
tr�>aps : the auxiliary c orps shall be ready to take the field 
in the most effective manner, for the safety of the power 
attacked or threatened ,  within two montho at latest after the 
requisition shall have been made . 
ARTICI& IX. 
As 1;he situation of the neat of war, or other circv..m­
ntances, might render it difficult for Great Britain to 
furnish the stipulated succours in English troopo within the 
term prescribed ,  and to maintain the same on a war establinh­
ment , His Britannic :&iaj esty reserves the right o:t' furnishing 
his cont ingent to the requiring power in foreign troops in hie 
pay , or to pay annually to that power a ::;uin of money , at the 
rate of twenty pounds sterling per each ua.n for infantry , c.nd 
of' thirty pounds sterling for cavalry ,  until the stipulated 
succour shall be complete . 
The mode of furni shing this succour by Great Britain 
s:h.all be settled c.raicably, in each particular case , betv1een 
His Britannic Majesty and the power threatened or attacked , 
as soon as the requisition shall be made : the sa�e principle 
shall be adopted vd th regard to the forces whi ch Hin Britannic 
Majesty engages to furnish by the first article of the pre nent 
treaty . 
AR�1 ICLE X� 
The auxiliary army shall be under the orders of tLe 
CortL."!ln..nder in Chief of' thf-\ army of the requiring power; it s!:e.11 
be commanded by i to own Genersl , n.n.<1 employed in a.11 milit<:...J:/ 
operation:: acc ording to the rules of war. ':rhc p[.;�y oi.' the 
auxili2.ry army uh.all be def rayed by the requi rint; porter; the 
rations and portions of provisions und forage , &c . as well ac 
quarters , shall be furnished by the requirinG power ac noon 
as the auxiliary army shall have passed i tc ovvn frontier; and. 
tha.t upon the same footing as the said power maintains , or 
shall maintain, its O\ivn troops in the field or in que..rtern. 
ARTICL"S �-�I 
Tho diGcipline anC. c..cl:ninii..;i;:.cc.tion of t�1c troops shall 
s olely depend upon their own co!illn::mder ;  "they shall not be 
eeparE>.te d .  The trophies and booty taken from the enemy Ghall 
belong to the troopc who tol\:e them. 
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ARTICLE XII. 
Whenever the amount of the stipulated succours ah.all 
be found inadequate to the exigency of the case, the High 
Contracting Parties reserve to themselves "';o make , without 
lose of time, an ulterior arrangement as to the additional 
ouccours ·which it may be deemed necesSal"'J to furnish. 
ARTICLE XII I .  
The High Contrnctin-g Parties mutually promis e ,  that in 
caoe they shall be reciprocally engaged in hostilitie::z, in 
consequence of furnishing the stipulated succours , the party 
requiring and the parties called upon, and acting as auxiliaries 
in the we.r , shall not make peace but by common consent . 
ARTICLE XIV. 
The eng_agements c ontractod by the pre:::;ent Treaty , shall 
not prejudice those which the High Contracting Parties may 
hn.ve entered into with other power�, nor prevent them from 
forming new engageraents •t.ri th other states, with a view of obtain,.... 
ing the same salutary result . 
ARTICLE X:V .  
In order to render �ore effectual the defensive eng<J.ge­
ments above stipulated , by uniting for their common defence 
the powern the most exposed to a Prench invasion, the Hieh 
Contracting Parties engage to invite those powers to accede to 
the present Troaty of defensive allianc e .  
AHTICLE XVI . 
The pre£ent Treaty of d3fensive alliance havine for itc 
object to maintain the equilibrium of Europe ,  to secure the 
repone and independa..�ce of itG states, ?..nd to prevent the 
invaGions which during so many yearn have desolated the world , 
the Hit;h Contracting Parties have Q.greed to  extend the duration 
of it to twenty years , to take date from the day of its signature ;  
and they reserve to themselveG ,  to concert upon itD ulterior 
prolongation, three yearn before itn expiration, should �ir­
cumctances require it . 
f_:UTICLE XVII . 
The present Treaty Dha.11 be ratified, and the ratification 
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exchanged within two months or sooner if possible . 
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries 
have aigned the same , and affixed thereto the seal of their 
ams . 
first of March, 
Done at Chaumont this seventeenth of February , in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen. 
( Signed) ( Signed) 
CASTLEREAGH . CHARLES ROBERT t 
(L. S . ) COMTE DE NESSELRODE. 
( L . S . ) 
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Al?PENDL"{ I I  
DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PE.AC:Z AND AMITY 
BETWEEN HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY AND HIS 
MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY 
SIGNED AT PARIS ,  THE 30TH DAY Oli' MAY 1814. 
In the Name of the I�ost Holy and Undivided Trinity. 
His 1\lajesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Brita.in 
and Ireland , and His Allies on the one part , and His J\iaj eG ty 
the King of France and of Navarre on the other part , animated 
by an equal desire t o t e rminate the long agitations of :r�uror� ,  
and the sufferings of mankind , by a permanent peac e ,  
founded upon a just repartition o f  force between its States 
and containing in its stipulations the pledge of its durability; 
and His Bri tEUUlic f4ajeety, to�ether with his Allies, being un­
willing to require of F1rance ,  nO\J that , replaced under the 
paternal government of her King:::; , she offers the assurance of 
security and stabili+.y to Europe , the conditionc and guarru1tees 
which they had with regret demanded from her former Government , 
their saio. Majesties have named Plenipo tent iarieo to di3cuss, 
nettle , and sign a Treaty of Peace and &'ni-ty ; namely , 
His Majesty the King of the United Kinr;dom of Great 
Britain a...11d Ireland , the Right Eonourable Hobert 3te'li;art , 
Viscount Castlereagh, one of His said Majesty ' s  Most Honourable 
Privy Council ,  Member of Parliament, Colonel of the London­
derry Regiment of rllili t i a ,  and Hi::> Princ ipal Secretary oi' 
State for Foreign Affairs , &c . & c . d:c . ; the Rit;ht I-101·.i.our2.ble 
George Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, V iscount li"ormart ine j Lord 
Haddo , l\Ietl1lic , Tarvis ,  and Kellie , .��c . one of tha Sixteen 
Peers representing the Peerage of Scotland in the Houne of 
Lord s ,  Knight of His Majesty ' s  Most Ancient and i1Iost Noble 
Order of the Thistle, His As�bassador Extraordinary antl Pleni­
potentiary t o  His Imperial and tloyal Apostolic Hfaj esty : the 
Right Honourable William Shaw vathcart , Viscount Cathcart , 
Baron Cathcart and Greenock , one of llis M'aJesty ' B  r-,10::-:;t Honour­
able Privy Council, Knight of His Order of the Thistle , and 
of the Orders of Rurrnia, General in His Majesty ' s  Ar.ny , and 
His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Maj c i::ty 
the Emperor of all the Russie.s ; and the Honourable Sir Gha.rle8 
\Villial'l 8tewart , Knight of His l\-laj esty ' s Mc st Honourable Order 
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of the Bath, Member of Parliament , Lieutenant-General in 
His Majesty ' s  Army , Knight of the Prussian Orders of the 
Black and Red Eagle , and of s everal others, and his Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty 
the King of Prussia; and Bis Majesty the King of F'ra.nce and 
Navarre , Charles Mauric e  de Talleyrand Perigord , Prince of 
Benevent , Gre�t Eagle of the Legion of Honour, Knight of the 
Black and Red Eagle of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Order 
of Leopold of Austria, Knight of the Russian Order of St . 
Andrew, and His said Majesty ' s  Minister and Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs ; who , having exchanged their full 
Powers , found in good and due form, have agreed upon the 
following Artieles : 
ARTICLE I .  
There shall be from this day forward perpetual peace 
and friendship between HiB Britannic J;lajesty and His Allies 
on the one part , and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre 
on the other,' their heirs and successors , their dominions and 
subj ects , respectively. 
The high contract ing parti e s· .shall devote their best 
attention to maintain. not only between Themselves ,  but , in­
asmuch as depends up0n them, between all the states of J.t..urope , 
that harmony and good understanding which are so necessary for 
their tranquillity. 
ARTICLE I I .  
The kingdom of Frr-.ince retains its limits entire , as 
they existed on the 1st of J'a:nuary , 1792 . It shall further 
receive the increase of Territory comprised within the line 
established by the following Article : 
ARTICLE I I I .  
On the side o f  Belgium, Germany and Italy , the ancient 
frontiers shall be re-established as they existed the 1st of' 
January 1792 , extending from the I�ort:':-1 Sea, between Dur..kirk 
and Nieuport, t o  the :Wfedi terrar1ean between Cagne£ and Nice 
with the following modifications : 
1st. In the department of Jemapp e s ,  the Cantons of 
Dour, Merbes-le-Chateau, Beaumont , and Chimay shall belong to 
France ,  where the line of demarkation comes in contact with 
the Canton of Dour, it shall pass between that Canton and thone 
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of Boussu and Pature.ge ,  and lilcewise further on it shall :pass 
between the Canton of P.�erbe s-le-Chateau, and ·those of Binck 
and Thuin. 
2. In the Department of Sambre and Meus e , the Cantons 
of Walcourt , Florenne s ,  Beauraing , and Gedinne , shall belong 
t o  France ;  where the dern.arkation rea.�hes th.at department , it 
shall follow the line which s eparates the said Cantons from the 
department of Jernappes , and f'rom the remaining Cru1tons of the 
department of Sam.bre and Meus e .  
3 .  In the department o f  the P,losell e ,  the new demarkation, 
at the point where it diverges from the old line of frontier, 
shall be formed by a line to be drawn from Perle to Fremersdorff, 
and by the limit which separates the Canton of Tholey from the 
remaining Cantons of the said de.partmen-t of the Moselle . 
4 .  In the department of La Sarre t the Cantons of Saar­
bruck and Arneval shall continue to belong t o  France ,  ao like­
wise the portion of the Canton of Lebach which io situated t o  
the South o f  a line dravm along the confines o f  the village$ o:f 
Herchenbach, Ueberhofen, Hilsbach and Hall (leaving these 
different places out of the French frontier) to the point 
where , in the neighbourhood of Querselle (which place belongs to 
France )  the line which separate s  the Cantons of Arneval a.nd. 
Ottweiler reaches that which separates the Cantons of Arneval 
and Lebach.. The frontier on this side shall be formed by the 
line above described , and a.ftc:nvards by that ·which separates 
the Canton of Arneval frora that of Bliescustel. 
5 .  The fortre ss of Landau having before the year 1792, 
formed an insulated point in Germany , France retains beyond 
her front iers a portion of the departments of· ·iiiount Tonnerre 
and of the Lower Rhine , for the purpose of uniting the said 
fortress and its radius to the rent of the kingdom. 
The new demarkation from the point in the neighbourhood 
of Obersteinbach (which place is left out of' the limits of 
]'ranee )  where the boundary between the depart�nent of the 
Moselle , and that of Mount Tonnerrc reaches the department 
of the Lower Rhine , shall follow the line wi'lich separates the 
Cantons of Weissenbourg and Bergzabe:rT1 ( on the side of France )  
from the Cantons of PermaBens Dahn , and .l\.nn.weiler (on the side 
of Germany ) as far as the point near the vills&e of Voll­
mersheim where that line touches the a...11tien·c; radius of the 
fortress of Landau. ]\rom this rad iuz \i'hich rE.:main:3 as it 
was in 1792 the new frontier shall follow the arm of the river 
de la Queioh, which on leaving the said radius at Queichheim 
( that place remaining to France )  flows near the villages of 
Merlenheim, K..."'li ttelsheim and Belheim ( these places also be1ont:�:­
ing to France )  to the Rl1ine which from thence shall continue to 
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form the boundary of France and Germuny. 
The main stream (Thalweg) of the Rhine shall constitute 
the frontier; provided, however, that the changes which may 
hereafter ta.lee place in the course of that river shall not 
affect the property of' the Islands. 1rhe right of possession in 
these Islands shall be re-established as it existed at t!le 
sir,nature of the Treaty of Luneville . 
6 .  In the de1Jartment of the Doubs the frontier ehall 
be so regulated as to conunence above the Rancormiere tJ.ec.r 
Locle and follow the Crest of Jura between the Cerneux, 
Pequienot end the villuge of F'ontenelles ,  aG far as the pealc 
of that J/lountain situated about seven or eight thousand feet 
to the North-west of the village of La Brevine , where it shall 
again fall in with the antient boundary of France .  
7. In the department of the Leman , the frontiers between 
the French territory, the Pays de Vuud and the different portions 
of the territory of the Hepu'blic of Geneva (which is to form pa.rt 
of Swis:;:;erland ) remain as they were before the incorporation 
of Geneva with Franc e .  But the Cantons of Frari..sy and o f  3t . 
Julien (with ,the exception of the districts situated to tLe 
north of a line drawn from the point v:here the river of La 
Laire enters the territory of Geneva near Chancy following 
the confines of Sesequin, Laconex end �eseneuve , which shall 
remain out of the limits of �,ranee )  the Cunt on o f  Rcignier, 
with the exception of the portion to the east of � line which 
follows the confines of the Muraz Bus�y Pers , and Cornier, 
which shall be out of the French limits � and the C::;nton of JJG. 
Roche (with the exception. of the places called La Hoche , cmcl 
Armar1vy with their dintrictf.: ) shall re21ain to France .  The 
frontiar shall follow the limits of these different 03.ntons . 
and the iine which separates the diotricts continuinc to 
belong to France ,  from those which :3he does not retain. 
In the Department of Montblanc , Fro.nee acquirec the ·..:ub­
Prefectnre of Chambery, with the exception of tl:.e Canton� of 
L � Hopital, St . Pierre d 'Albigny, La Rocette, a."1.d 1'for.:.tmelian, 
anc.i th€! nub-Prefecture of Annecy, with the exception o :r the 
portion of the Canton of Faverges ,  i:;i tuated to the east of G. 
line passing between Ou:rechaise and narlens on the �' ic.10 of 
France ,  and �darthod and Ugine on the oppoai te side , and which 
afterwards follows the crest of the rnountc::.ins ac far o..G the 
frontier of the Canton of Thone s ;  this line , together with 
the limit of the cantons before mentioned, shall on this f.� ide 
form the new frontier. 
On the side of the Pyreneee , tha frontiers l>etween tl:.e 
two kingdoms of France and Spain, remnin ouch as thoy were 
the l:::t of January , 1792 , and a j oint Commission Dhull be 
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named on the part of the two Crowns for the purpose of 
finally determining the line . 
France on her part renounces all rights of Sovereignty, 
Suzerainet e ,  and of pos session over all the countries, 
districts , towns and places situated beyond the frontier 
above described, the Principality of Monaco being replaced 
·on the zame footing on which it stood before the 1st of 
January , 1792 . 
The Allied Powers assure to Frs.nce the possession 
of the Principality of .Avignon, of the Comtat Venaissin , 
of the C omte of Jilontbeilliard , together with the several 
insulat ed territ-ories which formerly belonged to Germany, 
comprehended within ·the frontier above described, whether 
they have been incorporated \'ii th France before or after the 
lst of January , 1792 . The Powers reserve to themselve s ,  
reciprocally , the complete right to fortify any point in 
their respective states which they may judge necessary for 
their security . 
To prevent all in jury t o  private property, and protect , 
according to the most liberal principles, the property of 
individuals domiciliated on the frontiers , there shall be 
named , by each of the states bordering on France ,  C ommissioners, 
who shall proceed, conjointly with French Com issioners , to 
the delineat ion of the respective boundari e s .  
As soon as the Commissioners shall have perfori-�ed their 
task, maps shall be dravm, signed by the respective Com­
missioners , and posts shall be placed to point out the re­
ciprocal boundarie s .  
ARTICLE IV . 
To secure the communications of the t own of Geneva with 
other parts of the Swiss territory situated on the lake , 
France consents that the road by Versoy shall be COi11'1lOl'1 to 
the two c ountries. The respective Gove.n1.ments shall ruaicably 
arrange the means for prevent ing smuggling, regulating the 
post s ,  and maintaining the said road. 
ARTICLE V .  
The navigation o f  the Rhine , from the point v1here it 
becomes navigable unto the sea, �..nd vi ce versa, shall be fre e ,  
s o  that i t  can be interdicted t o  no one : and at the future 
Congres n ,  attention shall be paid to the establish.,'llent of' the 
principles according to which the duties to be raioed by the 
States bordering-· on the Rhine may be regulat ed, in the mode the 
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moot i;:-.upa.rtial , :llld the most favourable to the commerce of 
ull nations . 
The future Congress,  with a view t o  facilitate the 
corni�unication ·between nations, and continually to render 
them le ss strangers to each other, shall likewise exrunine 
und tletermine in what mar...ner the ubov& provision con be 
extended to other Hivers which, in their navigable course , 
s0parate or traverse different States . 
AHTICLE VI. 
Holland, placed under the Sovereigr,.ty of the House of 
Orange , shall rece ive an increa�.ie of territory . The title 
and exercise of that Sovereignty shall not in any case belong 
to a Prince wearing or destined to wear a foreign Crown. 
The States of Germany shall be independent and united 
by a federative bond . 
Switzerland , independent , shall continue t o  govern 
Hert3elf. 
Italy , beyond the lirnitE; of tl.:.e countries which are to 
revert to Austria, shall be composed of Sovereign States.  
ARTICLE VII . 
The Island of IYialta and it3 Dependencies shall belong 
in full right and Sovereignty t o  His Britannic Majesty. 
ARTICLE VIII . 
His Britannic Majesty, stipulating for Him.self and His 
Allies , engages to restore to Hii::: lltioct Christian Majesty , 
within the term v1hich shall be hereafter fixed , the colonies , 
fioherias , factories and establishments of every kind which 
wGre possessed by France on the 1st of January 1792 , in the 
Seas and on the Continents of America, Africa, and. Arda, with 
the exception however of the Islands of Tobago and St . Lucie 
and of the Isle of France and its Dependencies, especially 
Rodrigues and Les Sechelles , which several Colonien and 
Possessions His Most Christian l.lajesty cedes in full right and 
Sovereignty to His Britanni c J.li1aje:Jty, and alno the portion. of 
St . Domingo ceded to France by the Treaty of Easle , and which 
His Moot Christian Majesty restores in full right and Sovereignty 
to His Catholic Majesty. 
ARTICLE IX. 
His Idajesty the King of Sweden and Norway , in virtue of 
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the Arrnngements stipulated with the Allie s ,  and in execution 
of the pre c eding Artic l e ,  consents that the Island of Guada­
loupe be restored to His Most Christian Majesty, and give s up 
all the rights He may have acquired over that Island . 
ARTICLE X. 
Her fflost Fai thf'ul Majesty in virtue of the Arrangements 
stipulat ed with Her Allies and in execution of the 8th Article ,  
engagee to restore French Guyana as i t  existed on the 1st of 
January 1792 , to His Most Christian Maj esty , within the term 
hereafter fixed . 
The renewal of the dispute which existed at tha:· period 
on the sub j e c t  of the frontier, being the effect of thin stip­
ulation, it io agreed that that dispute shall be terminated by 
a friendly Arrangement between the two Court s ,  under the 
mediation of His Britannic Majesty. 
ARTICLE XI . 
The places and forts in those Colonies and Settlements ,  
which, by virtue of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Article s ,  are to 
be restored to His Most Christian Majesty, shall be given up in 
the state in which they may be at the moment of the signature 
of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE . 'XII. 
His Britannic Maj esty f,l'Uarantees to the Subjects of His 
Most Christian I<f!ajesty the same facilities ,  privileges , and 
:protection, with respec t to cmmnerce , nnd the security of their 
per3ono and property within the limits of the British Soverei£,nty 
on the Cont inE'-it of India , as are now or shall be granted t o  the 
most favoured Nations . 
His Most Christian Majesty, on .His part , having nothing 
more at heart than the per�etual duration of Peace between the 
Two Crovms of England and of France ,  and wishing t o  do His utmost 
to avoid any thing which might affect Their mutual good under­
standing , engages not to erect any fortificationn in the esto..blish­
ments which are to be restored to Nim within the limits of the 
British Sovereignty upon the Continent of India, and only t o 
place in those establishments the number of troops necessary 
for the maintenance of the Police. 
ARTICLE XII I .  
The F'rench right o f  fishery upon the Great B ank  of 
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N0v.1foundland, upon the coaots of the Island of that name , and 
of the adj acent Islands in the Gulf of St i. Lawrence ,  shall be 
replaced Ul)On the footing in which it stood in 1792 • . 
ARTICLE XIV. 
Thoce coloni e s ,  factories ,  and establis.h.ments ,  which are 
to be restored to His Most Christian Majesty by His Britannic 
Majeoty or His Allies in the Northern Seas , or in the seas on 
the Continents of America and Af'rica, shall be given up within 
the three months ; and those which are beyond the Cape of Good 
Hope within the six months which follow the ratification of 
the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE XV. 
The High Contracting Parties having , by the 4th Article 
of the Convention of the 23rd of April last, reserved to them­
selves the r�ght of disposing, in the present Definitive 
Treaty of Peace , of the arsenals and ships of war, armed and 
tll1armed, which may be found in the maritime places restored 
by the 2d Article of the said Convention; it is agreed, that 
the :::. aid vessels and··· ships of war, armed and unarme d ,  together 
with the naval ordnance and naval store s ,  and all :materials 
for building and equipment shall be divided between France 
and the countries where the said places are situated, in the 
proportion of two-thirds for France ,  and one-third for the 
Fower to whom the said places shall belong .  The shipG and 
ve�sels on the ' stock�• which shall not be launched ·within ::>ix 
weeks after the signature of the present Trea�y, shall be 
considered as materials , and after being broken up shall be , 
as such, divided in the same proportions. 
Commissioners shall be named on both sides to settle the 
division 2..nd draw up a statement of the same , and passports or 
safe conducts shall be granted by the Allied Powers for the 
purpose of securing the return into France of the workmen, 
sec.men and others in the employment of France .  
The vessels an.d arsenals ex;isting in the maritime places 
which were already in the power of the Allies before the 23d 
April , and the vessels and arsenals which belonged to Holland , 
and especially the fleet in the Texel, are n0t comprized in the 
above stipulations. 
The French Government engages to withdraw, or to cause 
to be sold evecy thing which shall belong t o  it by the above 
stipulations within the space of three months after the di vi:.:.:ion 
shall have been carried into effec t .  
Antwerp shall for tne future be solely a co1amercial port. 
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ARTICLE XV I .  
The High Contracting Parties , desirous t o  bury in 
entire oblivion the dissensions which have agitated Europe, 
declare and prornise that no individual , of whatever rank or 
condition he may be , in the countries restored and ceded by 
the present Treaty, shall be prosecuted, disturbed or molested, 
in his person or property, under a:ny pretext whatsoever, 
either on account of his conduct or political opinions , his 
attachment either to any of the Contracting Part i e s ,  or t o  
al1y Government which has cee.ued t o  exist , o r  for any other 
reason, excep·� for debts contracted t owards individuals, or 
actn po3terior to the date of the present Treaty . 
ARTICLE XVII .  
The native inhabi tants and aliens , o f  whatever nation 
or condit�on they may be , in those countrieu which are to 
change Sovereigns , as well in virtue of the present Treaty as 
of the subsequent arrangements to v1hich it may give ris e ,  shall 
be allowed a period of six years , reckoning:. ·frorn the exchange 
of the ratifications, for the purpose of disposing of their 
property, if they think fit, whether it be acquired before or 
C..uring the present war; and retiring to whatever country they 
may choose. 
ARTICLE XVI I I .  
The Allied Powers , desiring t o  offer His Most Christian 
majesty a new proof of their anxiety to arres t ,  as far as in 
them lie s ,  the bad cons'?.quence!i of the disastrous epoch 
fortunately terminated by the present Peac e ,  renounce all 
the suias which their Governments claim from }'ranee ,  whether 
on account of contract� , suppl i e � ,  or any other advances 
whatsoever to the :F'rench Government , during the different war;;:; 
which have taken place since 1792. 
His Most Christian Majesty, on hi;:; part , renounces every 
claim which He might bring fo:nvnrd against the Allied Power.s 
on the same grounds .  In execution o f  this �.rticle , the High 
Contracting Parties engage reciprocally to deliver up all 
titles , obligations , and documentc ,  which relate t o  the debts 
They may have mutually cancelled . 
ARTICLE XIX . 
The l1'rench Government eneagen t o  liquidate and pay o.11 
debts it may be found t o  owe in countries beyond itG ovrr1 
territory, on account of contrac t � ,  or other formal engage­
ments between individuals ,  or private e stablishments ,  and the 
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French Authorities, as well for supplies,  as in satisfaction 
of legal eng�ements . 
ARTICLE XX .  
The High Contracting Parties, immediately after the 
exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty , shall 
name Commisf:: ioners to direct and superintend the execution 
of the whole of the st ipulat ions contained in the 18th and 
19th Articles. These Corru!1issioneru shall undertal�e the 
examination of the claims referred to in the prec eding Arti cles , 
the liquidation of the sumo claimed ,  and the consideration of 
the manner in which the F'rench Government muy propose to pay 
them. �'hey Ghall alsc be charged with the deli very of the 
titles , bonds, and the documentt> relating to the debts which 
the High Contracting Parties mutually cancel , so that the 
approval of the result of their labours , shall complete that 
re ciprocal renunciation. 
ARTICLE XXI . 
The debts which in their origin were specially mort­
gaged upon the countries no longer belonging to France ,  or 
were contracted for the support of their internal administration, 
shall re:nuin at the charge of the said countries.  Such of those 
debts as have been converted into inocriptions in the great 
bool{ of the public debt of F'rance ,  shall accordingly be account­
ed for with the French Government after the 22d of December 181 3 .  
The deeds of all· those debts which have been prepared 
for imJcription, and have rwt yet been entered, shall be 
deli verea. to the Governments of the respective courrr.ries . 
The statement of all these debts shall be drawn up and settlefi 
by a j oint corrunission. 
ARTICLE XXII. 
The French Government shall remain charged with the 
reimbursement of all sums paid by the :::;ubjects of the said 
countries into the French coffers, whether under the de­
nomination of surety, deposit, or consignment . 
In like manner all French sub j ects , employed in the service 
of the said countrie s ,  who have paid sums ur1der the denominatlon 
of zurety , deposit ,  or consign:nent , into their respective terri­
torie;:; , shall be faithfully reimbursed.. 
AeTICLE XXI II. 
The Functionaries holding situations requiring securities,  
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who are not charged with the expenditure of public money 
shall be reimbursed at Paris ,  wi ·th the interest ,  by fifths 
and by the year, dating from the signature of the present 
T::-eaty. With respect to those who are accountable , this 
reimbursement shall commence , at the latest , six months 
after the presentation of their accounts ,  except only in 
cases of malversation. A copy of the last account shall be 
transmitted to the Government of their countries, t o  serve 
:for their information and guidanc e .  
ARTICLE Y...XIV. 
The judicial deposits and consignments upon the 
"caisse d ' amortissement " in the execution of the law of 
28 Nivose , year 13 (15 January , 1805 , )  and. which belong 
:t1o the inhabitants of the countries France ceases to posses s ,  
shal l ,  within the space o f  one year from the exchange of the 
Ratifications of the present ��reat:y , be placed in the hands o:f 
the Authoriti�s of the said countrie s ,  with the exception of 
those deposits and consignments interesting French subj e c t s ,  
which last will remain in the 11 caisse d ' amortissement . 11 
and will only be given up on the production of the vouchers , 
resulting from the decisions of competent authorities. 
ARTICLE XX.V. 
The funds deposited by the c orporations and public 
establishments in the "Caisse d e  service ttand in the ''Caisse 
d '  amorti s sement , "  or other "cirsse , 11 of the F'rench Govern­
ment , shall be reimbursed by fifths, payable from year to 
year, to commence from the date of the present Treaty ; 
deducting the advances which have taken plac e ,  and sub j e c t  
t o  such regular charges as may have been brought forward 
against these funds- by the creditors of the said corporations, 
and the said public establishments .  
ARTICLE ll7V I .  
From the first day o f  January 1814 , the French Govern­
ment shall cease to be charged with the payment of pension s ,  
c j vil� military and ecclesiastical ; pensions for retirement , 
a.'1.d m.llowance s  f0r reduction, to any individual who shall 
cease t o  be a French sub j e c t .  
National domains acquired for valuable considerations by 
French sub j ects in the late departments of Belgium, and of the 
left bank of the Rhine , and the Alps beyond the antient limits 
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of Frai.'1ce ,  and which now cease to belong to Her, shall be 
guaranteed to the purchasers. 
ARTICLE XXVIII. 
The a.bolition of the " droits d '  Aubaine , 0  de "Detraction, " 
and other dut ies of the same nature , in the countrie s  which 
have reciprocally made that stipulation with Franc e ,  or which 
have been formerly incorporated, shall be expressly maintaine d .  
ARrICLE XXIX. 
The French Government engages to restore all bonds, and 
other deeds which may have been seized in the provinces occupied 
by the French armies or administrations ; and in cases where 
such restitution cannot be effected, these bonds and deeds 
become and continue void . 
ARTICLE XXX. 
The sums which shall be due for all works of public 
utility not yet finished ,  or finished after the 31st of 
December 1812, whether on t�1e Hhine or in the departments 
detached from France by the preoent Treaty , shall be placed 
to the accoun� of the future possessors of the territory, 
and shall be paid by the com.11icsion charged with the liquidation 
of the debts of that country. 
ARTICLE XXXI .  
All archives ,  map s ,  plans and docu..rnents whatever, 
belonging to the ceded countries, or respecting their 
adminiztration, shall be faithfully given up at the came time 
with the scid countries : or if that should be impossible , 
'Ni thin a period not exceeding six months after the ces3ion of 
the countries themselves .  
This st ipulation applies to the archives ,  maps and 
plates ,  which may have been carried away from the countries 
during their temporary occupation by the different armie s .  
ARTICLE XXX:II .  
All the powers engaged on either side in the preoent 
war, shall , within the space of two months ,  send Plenipoten­
ti::i.rieo to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating in general 
Congres s ,  the arrangements which are to complete the provisions 
of the present Treaty. 
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ARTICLE XXXIII. 
The present Treaty shall be ratified , and the ratifications 
shall be exch2.nged within the period of fifteen day s ,  or sooner 
if possible . 
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
signed and affixed to it the seals of their arms . 
Done at Parin the thirtieth of May , in the year of our 
Lord one Thousand eight Hundred and fourteen. 
( L. S . )  
( T '"" ) .1.1 . 0 .  
( L . S . )  
(L. G . )  
CASTLEiil�AGR. (L. S . ) 
CAl'HCART . 
CHARLES STEWART , Lieut . -Gen. 
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES 
ARTICLE I .  
Ll� PRINCE DE 
BENEVENT • 
His I/Io�t Christian Maj e sty , concurring vli thout reserve 
in the sentiments of His Bri tannic majesty, with respect to a 
desc ript ion of traffic repugna.."'lt to the principles of natural 
jus t ice and of the enlightened. age in which we live , engages 
to unite all His efforts to tho se of His Britannic Maj esty, 
at the approaching Congress, to induce all the Powers of 
Chri stendom to decree the abolition o:f the Slave Trade , GO that 
the said Trade shall cease universally, as i t  shall ceaue 
defin5.tively , under any circumstanc e s ,  on the part of the 
F'rench Government , in the c ourse of five years ; and that , 
during the said period, no slave merchant shall import or 
sell sluvef.l ,  except in the Colonies of the 3tate of v;hich he 
is a sub j ect . 
ARTICLE I I .  
The British and French GoverrnaentB shall na"Ue , without 
delay , Cor ..n issioners to liquidate the accountn of their : c0-
cpecti ve expences for the maintenance of pri�rnners of war; in 
order to determine the manner of paying the balance which shall 
appear il� favour of the one or the other of the two Po•Nerr; • 
.AR'.I.'ICLE I I I .  
The respective pri soners o f  v1ar, before their departure 
from the place of their det ention , shall be obliged to dischurge 
the private debts they may have contrac ted, or shall at least 
give sufficient security for the amount .  
-97-
ARTICLE IV. 
Immediately after the Rutification of the present 
Treaty of Peac e ,  the �equeoters which since the year 1792 
( one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two ) may have been 
laid on the funds , revenues ,  debt s ,  or any other effects 
of the High Contracting Part ies or their sub j ects , shall 
be tnken off. 
The commissioners mentioned in the 2d art icle shall 
undertake the examination of the claims of .His Britannic 
Ma jesty ' s  subjects upon the French Government , for the 
value of the property , moveable or i!Illlloveable , illegally 
confiscated by the French Authorities,  as aloo for the total 
or partial loss of their debts or other property , illegally 
detained under sequester since the year 1792, (one thousand 
seven hundred and ninety-two ) .  
:F'rance engages to act t owards Dri tish subjects in 
this respect , in the same spirit of justice which the liirench 
sub j e cts have experienced in Great Britain; and His Britannic 
Majesty, des:i.ring to concur in the new pledge which the Allied 
Powers have given to His I'iiost Christian Majesty, of Their 
desire to obliterate every trace of that disastrous epocha 
so happily terminated by the present peac e ,  engages on His 
part , when complete justice shall be rendered to His sub j ects , 
to renounce the whole a.mount of the be.lance which shall. 
appear in His favour for su11port of the prisoners of war, so 
that til.e r·atification of the report of the above commissioners , 
and the discharge of the sums due to British Sub j e c t s ,  as well 
as the restitution of the effects which shall be proved to 
belong to them, shall complete the renunciation. 
AH�ICLE V .  
'l'he two High Contract ine Parties , desiring t o  establish 
the most friendly relations between Their respective sub j ects , 
reserve to Themselves, and promise to come to a 1nutual under­
standing and arrangement , as soon as possible, upon Their 
commercial interest s ,  with the view of encouraging and in­
creasing the prosperity of Their respective Stat e � .  
The present Additional Articles shall have the same 
force and validity as if they were inserted word for word in 
the Treaty Patent of this day . They shall be ratified, and the 
ratifi�ations shall be exchanged at the same t ime . 
In witness whereo f ,  the respective plenipotentiaries have 
signed and affixed to them the seals of their armn . 
( L .S. ) 
( L. S. ) 
( L. S . ) 
( L. :3 . ) 
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Done at Pario, the thirtieth day of May , in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hu11dred 
and fourteen. 
CASTLEREAGH. 
ABEHD.EEN . 
CATHCART . 
(L.S. } 
CHARLES 3TEWART , Lieut . -Gen. 
LE PRINCE DE 
.J3ENEVENT . 
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APPENDIX III 
CITtClJLAR OF PRINCE REPNIN 
"A letter of the Minister, Baron von Stein, dated 
October 21 , has informed me of a convention concluded 
September 28 at Vie1ma , by virtue of which his Wlajesty 
the E�nperor of Russia, in concert with England and 
Auntria will put the aclminiGtration of the kingdom of 
3e.xony into the hand::> of the King of Prussia. I run 
ordered to hand over the covernment of this c ountry 
to the representati vee. of his Hia j e sty the King of Prussia, 
and t o  replace the imperial Hussian troops by those of 
Prussia, in order t o  effect the union of Saxony and Pruss i a ,  
which will shortly take place in a more formal and solernn 
manner, and t o  establish a closer fraternity between the 
two nations. � After the preliminary deliberations, of 
which the aim is the well-beine; of the two parti e s ,  their 
Majesti es have declared the following : King Frederick 
\\'illiam, in his quality of future sovere ign of the country, 
has declared that he will not incorporate Saxony as a 
province of his states , bu·!; will unit e  it t o  Prussia 
under the title of the kingdom of Saxony , will preserve it 
always in its integrity , will leave it the enj oyment of 
its rights ,  privileges ,  and advantages which the con­
stitution of' Germariy will preserve for those partc; of 
Germany which form part of' the Prussian m.onarchy • and 
so far vlill change · nothing of its actual constitution. 
_i\nd his Majesty the Emperor Alexander has witnessed the 
Spec ial satisfaction he feels on acc ount of this declaration . "  
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APPENDIX IV 
SECRET TREATY OF DEFENSIVE ALLIA.!'lCE 
CONCLUDED AT VIENNA, JANUARY 3RD, 181 5 �  
BETVIE.EN AUSTRIA, FHA.NOE, AND GREAT BRITAIN . 
In the name of the Most Holy and indivisible Trinity. 
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland , His Majesty the King of France and 
Navarre , and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of 
Hungnry and Bohemia, being convinced that the Powers , to 
whose share it falls to complete the provisions of the 
tro:. t;y of Pari s ,  ought to be in a position of perfect 
se 0·tn·i ty and independence ,  in order to be able to acquit 
themselves with the fidelity and dignity requisite to so 
important a duty, and oonsequently, considering i t  necessary, 
in face of pretensions recently put forth, to provide means 
of repulsing any aggression to which their ovm possessions, 
or those of one of their number might be exposed, from a 
spirit of opposition t o  the measures they migil.t have 
t�ought it their duty to adopt and sustain by common consent , 
according to the principles of justice and equity ; and having 
not less at heart the c ompletion of the dispositions of the 
Treaty of Pari s ,  in a manner that may be most comformable to its 
true aim and spirit , have for these ends resolved to make a 
solemn convention and defensive alliance together .• 
Wherefore, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, has nominated, as hio pleni­
potentiary in this mutter, the most honourable Robert 
Stewart , Viscount Castlereagh • • • •  
His Majesty the King of France and Navarre , M .  Charles­
Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince de Talleyrand . . .. .  
And His T/Iajesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and 
Bohemia, Herr Clement-Wenceslas-Lothaire , Prinee of 
Metternich-Winneburg Ochsenhausen • • • • • • •  
Who , after having exchanged their powerti , Vlhich were 
found to be duly drawn up, agreed to the following articles :  
F'IHST ARTIC LE . -- The high contracting Powers mutually 
aeree ,  individually and collectively , to act in concert , 
with the moot perfect disinterentedncss and complete Good 
faith, in order ·to put into execution the arrangement::> of 
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the traaty of Paris nece�sar:{ to complete its dispo�i tions, 
and to see that they be carried out in a manner that shall 
be most conformable to the true spirit of the treaty . 
If, consequent upon this, and from avernion to proposals 
that may have been made and sustained by common agreement , 
the possessions of any of them were attacked, at such time 
and in such circumstance s ,  they promise and bind themselves 
t o  consider them all three as attn.eked, to make common cause 
with the one attacked, and t o  assist each other in repelling 
Dny such aggression with all the forces hereafter specified. 
ART . II � - If for the reo.sons above mentioned, \·vhieh can 
only give rise to the present allianc e ,  one of the high con­
tracting powers were to be threatened by· one or several powers , 
the tv�o other signat ories shall be bound t o  do their utmost, 
by means of a friendly intervention, to prevent hos-+;ilities. 
ART . III. - In case their efforts t o  attain that aim 
failed, the high contracting powers promise to come .i.mmediately 
to the help of' the pov1er att acked , each of them with an anny 
of one hundred and fifty thousand men. 
AHT IV . :_  Each aforesaid army will be composed re­
spect ively of one hundred and twenty thousand men of inf a.1try , 
e.nd thirty thousn.nd men of cavalry ,  with a train of artillery 
and ammunition proportionate to the number of troop s .  
In order to contribute more efficiently t o  the defence 
of the power attacked or threatened ,  the auxiliary troops 
aforesaid will have to be ready to take the field within a 
delay of' six weeks at the latest,  after being calied upon to 
do n o .  
ART . V� ---The situation of the countries which might 
biacome the Seat of v;ar, or other circumstances being likely 
to prevent England from providing, within the appointed delay, 
the stipulated cont ingent of English troops, and keeping it on 
a war-footing, His Britannic J..iajesty reserves to himself the 
right of providing foreign levies as his share of troops to 
the power requiring his help, the said foreign levies t o  be 
in the puy of England, or to pay annually to the power in 
question a sum of' money calculated at the rate of 20 pounds 
for each infantry soldier, and of' 30 pou.nds for a horseman, 
until the stipulated help have been completed. 
The way in which Great Britain will he�ve to provide her 
help will be arranged privately between His Britannic majesty 
anc1 the power threatened ,  as soon as tJ�e latter shall have 
c lnimed the said r.elp. 
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ART . VI. -The high contracting powers agre e ,  in case 
v1ar should break out , t o  arrange privately the mode of co­
operation best uuited to the nature as well ao to the object 
of the war, and to settle in like manner the plans of campaign, 
all matters relative to com.'na.11d ,  respecting which eve-ry facility 
sh�t.1.1 be o.f'forded ,  the lines of operation of the troops res­
pectively employed, the marches of those troops and their 
provisions in food and forage . 
ART . VII . -If it should be found that the help 
stipulated be not proportionate to the requirenents of 
circumstances, the high contracting powero reserve to them-
8elves the right of making together, within the shortest 
possible delay , a fresh arrangement fixing the additional 
help which may be deemed necesGary . 
ART . VIII . - The high contracting powero mutually agree 
that in case those who shall have provided the help stipulated 
above , should, for that reason, be involved in direct war 'Ni th 
the power t.gainst which their help shall have been proYided,  
the power that shall have claimed help and the powers from 
whom such help shall have been claimed , vmging war as auxiliaries,  
shall make peace only by mutual consent . 
ART . IX. ---The st ipulations agreed upon in the present 
treaty shall not alter or modify in any way a:ny provision which 
tho high contracting powers, or any of them, may have previously 
agreed upon or may subsequently consent to with other powers, 
inasmuch that those provisions are not or shall not be contrary 
to the object of the present alliLl.llc e .  
ART . X . - The high contractiilb powers , having no intention 
of age;randizing themselve s ,  and being solely animated by the 
desire of mutually protecting themselve� in the exercise of their 
rights and in the fulfilling of their duties as independent 
states,  agree , in case, which God forbid, war were to break 
out , to consider the Treaty of Pario as the legal basin on which, 
at the time of signing the peace, the nature , extent , and 
front ier3 of their respective doniniono should be settled. 
ART . XI . �  They moreover agree to settle all other 
�atters by mutual consent , whilst adherine , us far a3 cir­
cu_�cta.�ces will permi t ,  to the principlen and provisions of 
the aforesaid Treaty of Pari s .  
ART . XII .  --- The con�ractint; powern renerve to themselves ,  
by the present compact , the right o f  inviting all other powers 
to accede to this treaty in such delayn fl.nd under such conditions 
aG 3hnll have been agreed between them. 
ART . XIII. --- Hi3 Majesty the King of the United Kingdom 
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of Great Britain and Ireland, having on the Continent no 
posse ::.>sion which could be attacked in case of war alluded to 
in the prcoGnt treaty , the high contracting powers agree 
that if such war should brevJc out , and the posses sions of His 
I,Iajesty the King of Hanover or those of His HighnecG the 
3overeiei1 ?:--ince of the United Province s  of the Netherland � ,  
as well as thoce subr!li ttea. t o  his rule , were attacked, the 
naid contracting povmrs shull be obliged to act , in order to 
repulse that riggrescion, Em though the latt€r were directed 
against their ovm territory. 
ART . XIV . --- The present convent ion shall be rat ified , 
and its rat ifications exchunged at Vienna, within :::;ix weeki:: ,  
or sooner if possible . 
In �itness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries 
sit,-ned it and appended thereto the seals of their arms . 
Done at Vienna, on the thi rd day of January , in the 
year of our Lorrl one thousn.nd 0 ight hundred and fifteen. 
CASTLEREAGH . 
THE PRINCE VON I1IET'l1ERHICH. 
THE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND. 
SEPARATE AND SEc:rnT ARTICLE. 
The high c ontracting power:.:J r:;pecially c.gree ,  in the 
present £1.rticle , �o call upon the Ki� of Bavaria, the King of 
Eanover, and the Sovere ign Prince of the United Provinces of the 
Natherlands , to assent to the treaty of to-day ' s dat e ,  tmder 
rcaGonable conditions concerning the nU!nber of troopc they 
may be called upon to furnish as their share ; in their turn, 
the high contracting powers bind themselves to enforce tne 
full effect of the re8p ect ive provioions of the treatieG 
concer.aing Bavaria, Hanover, cmd Holland. 
It i s ,  however, unde rGt oo d  that in case one of the above 
raentioned powers shoulC. decline t o  assent to the precent treaty, 
after having been called upon to do :.:> o ,  an suid above , t!'!is 
power chall be coniJidered as having forfei te6 .. its rig�1ts t o  
the advantages t o  which it might have been entitled, i n  accord­
ance with the Gt ipulationc of to-duy ' n  convention. 
The present separate and secret article shall be as valid 
and binding ao though i t  were in3erted. nord for worcl in to-day ' s  
convention ; it will be ratified ru1d its ratification will be 
exchanged ut the sarne time . 
In witneez whereof the plenipotentiaries nigned it and 
appe:_cled thereunto the seal of their arms .  Done at Vienna, the 
third clay of January in the year of onr Lord one thouEand eight 
h1mdred und fifteen. 
(The signatures here follow. )  
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